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Peace operations have had difficulty in being accepted by the US Army, have not been 
institutionalized, and continue to challenge the Army as an institution. Insight from the 
sociological perspective known as social construction was used to examine doctrinal 
development and institutionalization. Social constructionism predicts that until a new 
mission is accepted by the individual and the group, it will continue to cause disequilibrium. 
The constant reconceptualization and changing terminology within peace operations reflected 
the inability of the Army to accept peace operations as a primary mission. The national 
security strategy of the US is the primary, the first step in the social construction of peace 
operations. When peace operations were considered to serve national interests, the Army 
began to develop appropriate doctrine for these missions. Army professional literature 
highlighted how the Army leadership conceptualized peace operations and the amount of 
attention that they believed should be dedicated to the mission. Doctrinal development was 
traced from post-World War II, demonstrating the inability of the Army to accept peace 
operations as a primary mission. Until a coherent doctrine for peace operations is developed, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
THE EVOLUTION OF US ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS 
by 
CPT James J. Wolff 
Peace operations have had difficulty in being accepted by the US Army, have not 
been institutionalized, and continue to challenge the Army as an institution. Insight from 
the sociological perspective known as social construction was used to examine doctrinal 
developmental and institutionalization. Social constructionism predicts that until a new 
mission is accepted by the individual and the group, it will continue to cause 
disequilibrium. The national security strategy of the US is the primary, the first step in 
the social construction of peace operations. The second step is the development of 
appropriate doctrine. The third step is an acceptance of the requirement to execute peace 
operations and the belief that an appropriate doctrine has been developed. 
Peace operations have been accepted as a secondary mission, but have not been 
institutionalized and continue to challenge the Army. This thesis has traced US Army 
participation in peace operations from the end of World War II to 1994. The national 
security policies of presidential administrations have been examined to determine the role 
they have played in doctrinal development. Individual operations were examined to 
determine the changing role of the military in foreign policy and how each mission was 
conceptualized. Doctrine was examined to determine the doctrinal evolution of peace 
operations. The military literature was examined to determine how professional military 
officers viewed the development of peace operations within the military institution. 
The national security strategy of the US during the first epoch evolved from the 
containment of Communism through collective security, to massive retaliation, to flexible 
response, and ended with the twin policies of detente and rapprochement. A congruence 
of objectives between the US and the UN served as a catalyst for US involvement in UN 
IX 
peace operations, but was limited to the use of MILOBs. The US participated in two 
essentially unilateral peace operations in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon. The 
Army's doctrine was expanded to include stability operations, which included missions 
which are now considered peace operations. A broad definition of peacekeeping within 
the government and the Army precluded any progress in the construction of the meaning 
of peace operations. 
The national security strategy of the US during the second epoch evolved from the 
Nixon doctrine, the Carter's focus on diplomacy and human rights, and ended with 
Reagan's revised strategy of containment through a revitalized military. The Army 
responded by developing AirLand Battle doctrine and focusing on the Soviet threat to 
NATO. The UN was ineffective during this epoch because of the increased tensions 
between the US and USSR. Multilateral operations in Lebanon and the establishment of 
the MFO reflected the inability of the UN to function. The deployment of a battalion from 
the 82nd Airborne Division to the MFO and the operations in Lebanon represented a 
commitment to the use of peace operations to achieve foreign policy objectives. LIC 
doctrine was developed , which included peacekeeping, but was not institutionalized and 
was not included in FM 100-5. Within military literature, a few officers recognized the 
need for doctrinal guidance on the conduct of peace operations. The process of 
constructing the meaning of peace operations began during this epoch, but was hindered 
by a lack of guidance by political and military leaders and the development of doctrine. 
The national security strategy of the US during the third epoch evolved from an 
assertive unilateral focus to a multilateral approach which included a renewed faith in the 
abilities of the UN as the Cold War came to an end. The death of 241 Marines in Lebanon 
was mitigated politically by President Reagan and the Grenada invasion which took place 
two days later. The US did not participate in the five new UN peace operations, but the 
establishment of ONUCA in the American sphere of influence represented the Bush 
administration's confidence in the capabilities of the UN. The Army began to return to 
a spectrum of conflict paradigm, but stressed the AirLand Battle doctrine was applicable 
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to all levels of conflict. Within the military literature, two consecutive Army Chief's of 
Staff noted that the likelihood of deploying troops to peace operations was growing. The 
process of constructing the meaning of peace operations continued during this epoch, but 
was hindered by a lack of political guidance, the rarity of operations, and definitional 
problems. 
The national security strategy of the US during the fourth epoch evolved from 
multilateralism to assertive multilateralism under the Clinton administration. PDD 25 was 
the first comprehensive evaluation of the role of peace operations and served as a means 
to communicate the administration's desire to use the UN to further US national interests, 
a cooperative atmosphere within the UN led to an expansion in the number and scope of 
peace operations. The US contributed Army units to five peace operations under UN 
command or authority. The deaths of soldiers in Somalia temporarily interrupted US 
participation, but the successful US-led Haiti operation and transition to UNMIH 
reinforced the US commitment to peace operations. 
Doctrine was expanded significantly to include a Joint Publication dedicated to 
peacekeeping and FM 100-23 Peace Operations. A spectrum of war paradigm was 
included in FM 100-5 and Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, the keystone 
document for joint doctrine. The military literature reflected the need for the development 
of a comprehensive doctrine to respond to the changes in the international environment. 
The scope of change was evident in the articles concerning training for peace operations 
at the CTCs and the lessons learned from participation in peace operations. However, the 
Army has not institutionalized peace operations. 
The first step in the process of constructing the meaning of peace operations has 
been met. The political leadership began to stress the importance of peace operations in 
the latter end of the Reagan administration and reinforced their importance during the Bush 
administration. The publication of PDD 25 by the Clinton administration clearly 





Although PDD 25 states that the military's primary mission is to fight and win, the need 
to conduct peace operations is clearly linked to the national security interests of the US. 
The second step in the construction of meaning has begun, but has not yet been 
met. The initial publications on peace operations represents the beginning of doctrinal 
development. A comprehensive doctrine is the next step which must be met. Campaign 
planning for peace operations must consider the unique nature of each peace operation. 
Political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and religious factors must be taken into 
consideration. Doctrine must address training, force composition, conflict dynamics, 
mission structures, and the principles and tenets of peace operations. The Army may need 
to make the conceptual leap from AirLand Battle and develop a separate doctrine for these 
operations. 
The third step in the construction of meaning has also begun, but has also not been 
met. The Army leadership has accepted the fact that peace operations will be conducted 
for the foreseeable future. Although they will always be considered a secondary mission, 
they do not have to be considered of secondary concern. Peace operations bring many of 
the risks of actual combat. Many of the frustrations reflected within the military literature 
is directed at the need for a coherent doctrine. While there is a consensus for the need to 
execute peace operations, there is also a consensus that appropriate doctrine has not been 
developed. 
Initial steps have been taken in doctrinal development, but the process is not 
complete. Peacekeeping doctrine has progressed the furthest and is generally accepted by 
the Army. Support to diplomacy and peace enforcement continue to challenge the Army 
and there is a consensus that the appropriate conceptual framework has not been developed 
within current doctrine. Until a coherent doctrine is developed, peace operations will not 










I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The Army has conducted peace operations since the end of the Revolutionary War. 
The Indian campaigns, interventions throughout Latin America, the Boxer Rebellion 
Intervention, and numerous shows of force throughout the world reflect a vast experience 
in peace operations. The purpose of this thesis is to explain why peace operations have 
had difficulty in being accepted by the Army, have not been institutionalized, and continue 
to challenge the Army. It will examine how the Army has thought about peace operations 
over time and the issues and concerns which have dominated the discourse. 
The term peace operations can mean almost anything and has been frequently used 
to describe the whole range of missions that fall under Operations Other Than War 
(OOTW). Peace Operations were more rigorously defined in Army doctrine with the June 
1993 publication of FM 100-5, Operations. However, this terminology is rarely found 
outside of Army doctrine. Involvement in Somalia has been characterized by the Army, 
the government, and the press as a peace operation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
humanitarian assistance, nation building, and nation assistance. 
This thesis will trace the history of US Army peace operations. The theory of 
social constructionism will be used to explain the difficulty that the Army has had in 
institutionalizing peace operations and developing relevant doctrine. The political 
leadership will be examined to determine their influence on the Army. The development 
of doctrine and force structures for peace operations will be examined from post-World 
War II to the present. Issues of Military Review, Parameters, Army Digest, and Army 
provide a basis to examine the views of military officers and relevant civilian authors 
throughout the history of peace operations. 
This thesis will divide peace operations into four "epochs": 1946-1973 (absence 
of doctrine to stability operations); 1974-1982 (development of AirLand Battle to the 
r"  : 
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deployment of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)); 1983-1989 (MFO to the 
end of the Cold War); and 1990 to 1994 (post-Cold war era). 
B. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 
Social constructionism is a sociological perspective which emphasizes the role 
played by meaning and belief in social life. There is a loop between the construction of 
meaning and behavior, each reinforcing the other. Social constructionism acknowledges 
that society shapes behavior and "emphasizes that these forces are not separate from 
human activity but are rather the product of human behavior."1 Social constructionism 
emphasizes a central insight into the basic nature of society, that human beings are actors 
which are constantly shaped by the environment around them. Human behavior is thus 
shaped by the meaning and beliefs by which individuals understand a situation. 
Meaning refers to a broad complex of "feelings, perceptions, moods, thoughts, 
ideas, beliefs, values, and morals."2 Meaning is constructed through daily interaction with 
the community in which an individual lives. "Our ability to navigate our way through the 
complexities of social life is completely dependent on socially constructed stocks of 
knowledge. These 'recipes for living' are sets of meanings, rules, and paths of action that 
tell us how to achieve all the mundane activities that make up daily life. "3 These "recipes 
for living" constitute the ability of individuals to interact with other people and understand 
the world around them. When meaning becomes taken for granted, independent of the 
actor, the situation is frequently called an institution. 
Institutions allow individuals to act, rather than think about their actions, while they 
conduct their affairs in social life. When the social world appears to be something other 
*Dana P. Eyre, David R. Segal and Mady W. Segal, "The Social Construction of 
Peacekeeping" in Peacekeepers and Their Wives. (Westport, CN:  Greenwood Press, 1993), 
p. 44. 
2Ibid., p. 46. 
3Ibid., p. 47. 
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than the product of an individual's actions, it has become an objectification. The process 
of objectification provides the basic structure within which individuals interact within 
society. However, the process is continually ongoing as individuals attempt to adapt to 
changes in their social world. Situations change and meaning is reconstructed to continue 
to make sense of the social world. 
The US government is tasked with formulating national security policy. The US 
Army, as an organization, is tasked with implementing these policies as dictated by the 
government. Success or failure to carry out these policies are dependent on how the Army 
receives, formulates and implements the required doctrinal template and the acceptance of 
the missions by the organization. In addition, the interpretation of success or failure will 
be dependent on how society constructs the meaning of each individual mission. 
This thesis will argue that peace operations have not been institutionalized within 
the Army because of the relative rarity of operations and the secondary importance that the 
organization has placed on these missions. Because of the constant reconceptualization and 
changing terminology, peace operations have been subjected to continuing turmoil 
resulting in a lack of social construction. The views of political leaders, the doctrinal 
development within the Army, and the changing perspectives of authors within the 
professional Army literature will be used to demonstrate how the Army, as an 
organization, has gone through the social reconstruction of peace operations. 
C. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
The impact of the political leadership on the social construction of peace operations 
will be traced through national security policy. Each president, in conjunction with his 
advisors, develops a national security policy which outlines the national interests of the 
United States and contains guidance to the military for accomplishing missions which 
protect those interests. In addition, Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) are 
occasionally published which provide insight into how the current administration views a 
variety of military operations. National security policies and PDDs will be used to 
demonstrate how the political leadership of the US viewed peace operations.    The 
ID
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relationship between the US and the UN will be examined to determine the role the 
administration expected the organization to fulfill. 
The views of the political leadership are important because they are the first step, 
the key link to constructing the meaning of peace operations. Their views will shape 
doctrine and influence how the organization conceptualizes peace operations. If they view 
these missions as being of little importance, they will be regulated to a second class 
category which needs little attention. If they view these mission as becoming increasingly 
important, a conscious decision will be made to ensure that the military is prepared to 
execute these missions. 
D. PEACE OPERATIONS 
Individual operations will be examined to discuss how the operation was 
conceptualized by political and military leaders. All UN peace operations will be 
discussed briefly to identify the changing role of the UN in peace operations. Peace 
operations which involved US forces will be examined in more detail to identify the 
expansion and changes to the missions which the Army was expected to execute. The 
affects of political leadership and military doctrine on operations will be revealed through 
this examination. 
E. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT 
At the core of the Army is doctrine. 
Doctrine preconditions the advice given to civilian decision makers by the 
military as well as the military's views of its own capabilities and the nature 
of the war it is called upon to fight. It serves to determine, if not national 
policy, then the way in which that policy is implemented.4 






Doctrine is developed in several ways. Service schools, TRADOC, regional commands, 
and professional journals all serve as forums for the development of doctrine. Training 
serves as a proving ground to evaluate doctrine and to provide feedback through these 
forums. The ultimate proving ground is the deployment of a force to accomplish national 
objectives. These deployments provide negative and positive feedback concerning 
doctrine, which leads to its acceptance or refinement. 
FM 100-5, Operations is the Army's cornerstone doctrinal manual, referred to by 
many as the bible on how to fight. This manual provides the definitive statement on the 
entire "spectrum of conflict." Additional manuals supplement FM 100-5 and provide a 
more detailed description of the missions that the Army may be called upon to execute. 
In recent years, Joint Publications have provided the doctrinal guidance on how the 
services will execute missions in conjunction with each other and with civilian agencies. 
Doctrinal development is the second step in the construction of meaning. 
F. MILITARY LITERATURE 
Professional military publications provide the entire Army with a forum for 
discussing past, current, and future operations as well as discussing the doctrine that guides 
these operations. This thesis focused on the three mainstays of professional Army 
publications: Military Review, Army (formerly Army Digest), and Parameters, beginning 
with the year 1946. All articles which discussed any variant of the current categories or 
definitions contained in FM 100-23 Peace Operations were extracted. Military literature 
will be used to trace the conflicting views and definitions which contributed to a continual 
social reconstruction of peace operations. An acceptance by Army leaders of the 
requirement to conduct peace operations and a belief that appropriate doctrine has been 
developed is the third step in the construction of meaning. Doctrine is irrelevant if the 
leadership does not understand, believe in, and promote it. 
5 
G. PEACE OPERATIONS EPOCHS 
The four epochs of peace operations are shaped by the above categories. The first 
epoch, 1946 - 1973, saw the development of stability operations within Army doctrine. 
The Cold War had begun and the US pursued national security objectives through the UN, 
multilaterally and unilaterally. During this epoch the United States participated in ten UN 
operations and an essentially unilateral operation in the Dominican Republic. Vietnam and 
the eventual withdrawal of combat forces contributed to doctrinal development. 
The second epoch, 1974 - 1982, was characterized by a retrenchment in doctrine. 
Stability operations were discarded and the development of AirLand Battle doctrine 
focused the Army on conventional war. During this time period operations within 
Lebanon resulted in the death of 230 Marines by a suicide bomber, an operation in 
Grenada was conducted, and a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to the 
Sinai as the core of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). 
The third epoch, 1983 - 1989, was characterized by debate within the Army 
concerning the utility of low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine. The Army virtually ignored 
the continuing rotation of battalions to the MFO. The epoch ended with the announcement 
by Michael Gorbachev that the Soviet Union was prepared to deploy peacekeepers to assist 
the United Nations in pursuing world peace. 
The fourth epoch, 1990 - 1994, has been characterized by an explosion in the 
number of peace operations conducted, changing views by the political and military 
leadership, a flurry of new doctrine, and vigorous debate within the professional literature. 
The UN established fourteen new peace operations and the United States contributed 
combat soldiers to five of these operations. 
The fourth epoch of peace operations continues today. The social construction of 
peace operations is incomplete and may never be completed. The Army remains focused 
on the mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Doctrinal change occurs slowly 
and the Army has discarded war-fighting and non-warfighting innovations throughout its 
history. Prospects for a fifth generation of peace operations will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 









The four chapters that follow will examine the topics discussed above by epoch. 
The theory of social constructionism will be used to explain how the Army, as an 
institution, adapted to the changes that the political leadership sought. The national 
security policy of each administration will be examined to determine the expected role of 
the military in the conduct of foreign policy. Individual operations will be examined to 
discuss how the operations were conceptualized. Army and Joint Publications will be used 
to discuss doctrinal changes. The military literature will be used to highlight the changing 
definitions of peace operations and the professional opinions concerning those changes. 




H. ABSENCE OF DOCTRINE TO STABILITY OPERATIONS:  1945-1973 
A. POLITICAL FACTORS 
At the end of World War II, the US Armed Forces went through the greatest 
demobilization in its history. Germany and Japan had been defeated and the UN was 
viewed by the American polity and public as being the instrument through which the world 
would settle its differences. The permanent members of the Security Council consisted of 
the major Allied powers of World War II, a continuance of the relationship developed 
during the war. All of the Army efforts were centered on the problem of demobilization; 
the future size of the Army and the long-range security of the US would be considered 
later. By January 1948, the Army had been reduced from a strength of 8,267,958 to 554, 
030.5 Its primary task was to administer the occupation of defeated Axis powers. 
In September 1947, the Rio Treaty marked the beginning of the new US peacetime 
policy of collective security. Each country which desired to keep their freedom was to 
help itself towards this end, and then help its neighbor. The US, as the nation with the 
greatest resources and most able to assist other countries, became the greatest contributor 
of assistance to other countries. Great Britain's inability to maintain a sufficient level of 
military force in Greece resulted in the Greek Government requesting assistance from the 
United States on March 3, 1947. On March 12, 1947, President Truman requested and 
received authority to provide $400 million in civilian and military aid to Greece to prevent 
the spread of communism. This was the beginning of the Truman Doctrine, through 
which the US would provide aid to further collective security and prevent the spread of 
communism. 
The next milestone was the approval of the Marshall Plan. In June 1947, Secretary 
of State Marshall proposed that the US provide aid to assist in the return to political 
stability and world peace. In December, Congress passed an interim foreign aid act which 
5Donnelly, Charles H., United States Defense Policies Since World War II, 





provided assistance to Austria, China, France, and Italy. This was followed by the 
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which established the Economic Cooperation 
Administration to provide assistance to countries fighting communism by helping improve 
their economic viability. 
The US Senate passed a resolution on June 11, 1948, which urged the 
establishment of regional and collective security arrangements within the framework of the 
UN to protect the national security of the US. On June 24, the USSR closed all rail 
traffic into Berlin and by August 4 had imposed a complete blockade. The Berlin Airlift 
successfully persuaded the USSR to call of the blockade, but the Soviet action convinced 
the US of the need for a structured policy in Europe. On April 4, 1949, the US signed the 
North Atlantic Treaty and entered its first peacetime European military alliance. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established to implement the treaty. On 
October 6, 1949, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was approved to provide military 
assistance to countries which were unable to provide for their own military defense from 
aggression. 
The Korean War and the decision to send armed forces into combat marked the 
beginning of a new policy for the US. The use of overt armed force by the Communists 
presented a clear challenge to the US, which feared a failure to respond would lead to a 
series of peripheral conflicts. For the first time in the Cold War, the policy of containing 
Communism placed US forces into a foreign war in which they were not free to use all of 
their capabilities. The national strategy of the US became to prevent further Communist 
expansion on the Free World by means short of total war. On January 7, 1954, President 
Eisenhower introduced the policy of massive retaliation. In the following months this 
policy was refined into the dual strategy of massive retaliation and graduated deterrence. 
The administration sought to use the UN as an additional means of preventing the 
expansion of Communism. 
Massive retaliation was a policy which sought to deter the USSR from initiating 
general war by maintaining a second strike capability.   Graduated deterrence included 
10 
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collective security, foreign assistance, and a strong military which could respond to limited 
wars with the minimal force required to achieve victory and keep the conflict from 
evolving into general war. Collective security and foreign assistance were pursued through 
the mutual security program. The military portion was called the Military Assistance 
Program (MAP), which was administered in each country by the senior American 
diplomatic representative. He was assisted by a country team which was comprised of the 
Diplomatic Mission, the International Cooperation Administration Mission, and the 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). 
On March 28, 1961, President Kennedy listed eight defense principles which would 
assist in accomplishing national security objectives. Reflecting concern over limited war, 
Kennedy stated that the "strength and deployment of our forces in combination with those 
of our allies should be sufficiently powerful and mobile to prevent the steady erosion of 
the free world through limited wars; and it is that role that should constitute the primary 
mission of our overseas forces. "6 The Army responded by strengthening its conventional 
general purpose forces to give the President a "Flexible Response Strategy," an alternative 
for dealing with crises. 
The Domino Theory demanded a response to the perceived Communist menace 
growing in South Vietnam. The Johnson administration was convinced that a military 
solution was possible in Vietnam, buoyed by the success of the operation in the Dominican 
Republic. The 1968 Tet Offensive and the intense media demand for an end to the war 
convinced Johnson that after years of effort and thousands of lives, the war was not being 
won. Johnson declined to run for reelection and Nixon took office believing that he had 
to achieve a "peace with honor." He believed that the political impact of abandoning 
South Vietnam would tarnish the US polity, undermining its credibility. 
Nixon was convinced that the US lacked the economic or political ability to 
implement a strategy of flexible response. Drawing on the policies of the Truman 
administration, the Nixon doctrine was developed. Nixon and Kissinger believed that US 
6Ibid., p. 9. 
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vital interests required a balance of power between the USSR, Europe, the US, Japan and 
the People's Republic of China (PRC). By maintaining this balance of power, the USSR 
could be contained and US vital interests would be protected. The rest of the world was 
considered to be of peripheral interest and would be assisted through economic and 
weapons assistance, but not through the use of military force. By providing this 
assistance, the Nixon administration sought to develop regional powers to maintain 
regional order. 
To maintain the balance of power, the US pursued a policy of detente with the 
USSR and rapprochement with the PRC. The policy of detente involved an increase in 
trade with the USSR to create a beneficial economic and political relationship which was 
to prevent the USSR from threatening that relationship through aggression. The policy of 
rapprochement was designed to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet split, forcing the USSR to be 
concerned with a potentially hostile threat to its eastern flank. The signing of SALT I and 
the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty in 1972 were at the core of detente. 
Nixon adopted a nuclear policy of sufficiency, which together with the treaties, 
precluded an expensive arms race with the USSR. Nixon made it clear that diplomacy, 
detente and rapprochement would be the centerpiece of his national security policy. Nixon 
ended the draft and implemented the all-volunteer force in 1972, reinforcing his objective 
of deemphasizing military force as a US policy. In 1973, Congress passed the War 
Powers Act, over a presidential veto, limiting the president's power to commit military 
forces without congressional approval. The epoch came to a close when the Congress 
voted to eliminate all combat funds for the US military in Indochina after August 15, 
1973. 
B.   OPERATIONS 
UNSCOB 
Greece was the first battleground of the Cold War. Great Britain and the USSR 
exchanged accusations in the United Nations that the other was interfering in the internal 




cause of violent border incidents between Greece and Albania. The UN investigation 
confirmed that Greek communist guerrillas were receiving support from the Communist 
governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. To preclude a Security Council veto 
by the USSR, the US proposed the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee 
on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in the General Assembly. Its purpose was to assist in 
establishing "normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations."7 The Committee's 
mandate was to "observe the compliance by the four governments concerned with the 
foregoing recommendations [and] be available to assist the four government's concerned 
in the implementation of such recommendations."8 
UNSCOB was the first UN action which came as a result of Cold War competition 
and demonstrated Free World support for the Truman Doctrine. The US provided seven 
Military Observers (MILOBs) to UNSCOB,9 the first participation of the Army in post 
World War II peace operations. The Army did not have a doctrine or established 
procedure for the assignment of officers to participate in these missions. At this time, 
there were no restrictions on which countries could contribute to UN operations. 
UNTSO 
On June 11, 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) 
was established to supervise the truce in Palestine. UNTSO was comprised of military 
observers from five countries and had a mandate which included: "(1) demarcating 
armistice lines; (2) mediating differences between the parties; (3) establishing demilitarized 
zones in accordance with the terms of the General Armistice Agreements; (4) deterring an 
7Birgisson, Karl Th., "United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans," in Durch, 
William J., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping. (New York:  St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 
79. 
8Ibid., p. 79. 
9Higgins, Rosalyn, United Nations Peacekeeping:  Documents and Commentary, Vol. 
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arms build-up; (5) facilitating the exchange of prisoners; and (6) investigating complaints 
of violations of the agreement."10 
The US initially contributed 21 MILOBs, which grew to 125 officers and 125 
enlisted personnel by August 1, 1948." The US provided three Military Chief of Staffs: 
LTG William E. Riley (September 1948 - June 1953); COL Byron V. Leary (November 
1956 - March 1958); and COL R.W. Richert (July 1960 - December 1960), demonstrating 
a high level of US commitment to the mission. Although the USSR did not veto the 
establishment of UNTSO, it did abstain from voting and complained that the whole 
operation was biased by the high-level of participation of Western powers. 
UNMOGIP 
On January 24, 1949, the United Nations Military observer Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established to oversee a cease-fire between India and Pakistan 
in the disputed state of Kashmir. The mandate included observation of the cease-fire line, 
investigation of alleged breaches, adjudication of conflicting claims, and recording the 
nature and disposition of the forces.12 The US provided 18 MILOBs to UNMOGIP and 
COL Siegfried PL Coblentz served as the Acting Chief of Military Observers from 1 
November 1949 - 27 October 1950.13 In February 1954, the US promised military 
assistance to Pakistan and India requested that the UN expel all US personnel from 
UNMOGIP. In a compromise agreement, the UN decided to allow the US personnel to 
serve out their commitment. It was the first instance in which a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council was requested to cease participation in a UN mission. 
10Ghali, Mona "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization:   1948 - Present", in 
Durch et al., pp. 90-91. 
"Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping. VOL I, p. 67. 
12Birgisson, "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," in Durch 
et al., p. 277. 
13Wiseman, Henry, Peacekeeping:  Appraisals & Proposals. (New York:  Permagon 
Press, 1983), p. 431. 
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KOREA 
On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. In a series of UN Security 
Council Resolutions, the US was designated as the lead nation to enforce a cease-fire and 
to ensure the return of the North Korean forces north of the 38th parallel. The resolutions 
passed because the USSR had pulled its representative from the Security Council on 
January 13, 1950, in protest of the National Chinese representative being seated on the 
Security Council. The US appointed General MacArthur as the UN Commander and all 
countries contributing military forces were asked to place them under his command. It 
was the first time that the UN conducted an enforcement action. 
UNEF I 
On November 12, 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) was 
established to observe the cease-fire and withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces 
from Egyptian territory following the 1956 Suez Crisis. This was the first armed UN 
peacekeeping operation which served as a precedent for future UN operations. The 
mandate for the operation, which was passed in the General Assembly, directly forbade 
the use of troops from the permanent members of the Security Council. The only role that 
the US played in the mission was the airlift of men and materiel. Diplomatically, the US 
worked through multiple channels to defuse the crisis and to ensure that the General 
Assembly would approve the mission. 
UNOGIL 
On May 13, 1958, President Charmoun of Lebanon inquired whether the US would 
intervene militarily if he requested assistance to stabilize the deteriorating conditions in his 
country. President Eisenhower responded that he would intervene to support the current, 
legal government and to protect American lives and property, but only if one other Arab 
state agreed to a US presence. On May 22, Lebanon brought allegations of UAR 
intervening in their internal affairs. On June 11, after the Arab League failed to devise 
a plan to settle the problem, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 
was established to ensure there was no further illegal infiltration of personnel or materiel 
15 
lJ
across Lebanese borders.   The force consisted entirely of MILOBs and the permanent 
members of the Security Council were not allowed to contribute personnel to the mission. 
BLUE BAT 
On July 14, the pro-Western government of King Faisal of Iraq was overthrown 
in a violent coup. President Charmoun immediately requested US assistance. The US 
declared that they were acting under Article 51 of the UN Charter - helping a legitimate 
government, at its own request, to defend its country against external aggression - and a 
Marine force landed the next day. This force was followed by an airborne battlegroup 
from the 187th Infantry Regiment in Germany and other supporting troops. Ambassador 
Henry Cabot Lodge told the Security Council that US troops would cooperate with 
UNOGIL and that they would be withdrawn as soon as the UN could take over the 
operation. On July 17, the US proposed that UNOGIL be transformed into an armed 
peacekeeping force, which the USSR vetoed. A resolution to expand the size of UNOGIL 
passed a few days later. 
During the next three weeks, General Chehab was elected to the presidency of 
Lebanon and the new government of Iraq was recognized by the US. The US then sent 
a letter to the President of the Assembly agreeing to withdraw its forces if the General 
Assembly determined their presence to be "unnecessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security."14 The General Assembly passed the resolution 
unanimously and the US forces were withdrawn on October 31. The US operation, in 
conjunction with UNOGIL, resulted in a relatively stable environment for the next 25 
years. 
ONUC 
In January 1960, Belgium agreed to grant the Congo independence through a six 
month transition in which Belgian nationals would assist the transition to full autonomy. 
On July 5, garrisons closest to the capital revolted and violence spread throughout the 
entire country. On July 10, the Congolese requested US assistance to help restore internal 
14Ghali, "United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon:  1958," in Durch, et al., p. 169. 
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order. The US referred the Congolese to the UN, and on the 13th they cabled the UN 
requesting assistance and stating that only neutral-country military personnel were 
acceptable. On the 14th, they asked for the Soviet Union to render assistance and Premier 
Khrushchev expressed his willingness to comply. On 15 July, the United nations 
Operations in the Congo (ONUC) was initiated to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, 
to assist the government in the maintenance of law and order, and to provide technical 
assistance.15 As a civil war spread through the country, the UN expanded the scope of its 
mandate. The mandate was modified and called for the force to maintain the territorial 
integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo, prevent the 
occurrence of civil war, and to secure the removal of all foreign forces not under the 
control of the UN. The force was increased to over 20,000 troops and civilians. The US 
provided airlift and sealift to the UN force, as well as supplies and equipment. 
UNTEA 
On October 3, 1962, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) 
was established to supervise the transition of western New Guinea from Dutch colonial 
rule to Indonesian administration. The mandate called for the force to maintain peace and 
security in the territory during the transition. UNTEA was paid for by the Dutch and 
Indonesian governments as part of a brokered settlement by the US. The force was 
primarily Pakistani, with the US providing supporting aircraft and crews. The mission 
ended on April, 30, 1963, with the transfer of administration to Indonesia. 
UNYOM 
On July 4, 1963, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was 
established to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement 
between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The disengagement agreement was 
brokered by the US, but lack of support to the mission by the US and the UN led to a 
complete withdrawal on September 4, 1964. The civil war continued for another six years 




and was finally ended when the local parties concluded a compromise settlement between 
themselves. 
UNFICYP 
On August 16, 1960, an independent Republic of Cyprus was established as part 
of a negotiated settlement between Britain, Greece, and Turkey. On December 21, 1963, 
fighting broke out between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. On December 24, Britain, 
Greece, and Turkey offered to provide a peacekeeping contingent and the government of 
Cyprus accepted the offer. Sporadic violence continued throughout the country and in 
January 1964, Britain suggested that a NATO force be sent to the island with US 
participation to prevent an intra-NATO conflict between Greece and Turkey. The US 
accepted the idea, but the Cyprus government rejected the plan. On March 27, 1964, the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established to prevent 
further escalation and restore normal conditions. The US supported the operation 
financially and provided airlift to UNFICYP. 
POWER PACK 
On May 30, 1961, Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican 
Republic, was assassinated. Joaquin Balaguer assumed the presidency and the riots erupted 
across the country in protest against the possibility of a continuation of the dictatorship. 
After a show of force by a US naval task force, the Balaguer government established a 
council of state to govern until elections. On December 20, 1962, Juan D. Bosch was 
elected president. On September 25, 1963, he was ousted in a military coup and was 
deported. The US recognized the new government on December 14, 1963, and Foreign 
Minister Donald Reid Cabral was named head of the governing civilian junta a week later. 
On April 24, 1965, supporters of former President Bosch staged a military uprising and 
the Reid government fell the next day. 
As the level of violence rose, the Navy moved a task force towards the Dominican 
Republic in anticipation of the need to deploy Marines. On April 27, the task force began 
a limited evacuation of Americans from Santo Domingo. The next day, President Johnson 
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announced that the US Government had been informed by authorities in the Dominican 
Republic that they could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans and that US military 
assistance was needed to safeguard them. President Johnson added that four hundred 
Marines had already landed.16 
The US notified the UN Security Council of the action and the Organization of 
American States (OAS) held a meeting to consider the crisis on April 29. On May 1, the 
OAS announced that it was sending a committee of five to attempt to negotiate a cease-fire 
and to assist in evacuating foreigners. The OAS also urged the warring factions to 
establish an international neutral zone of refuge. Acting unilaterally, President Johnson 
announced that the US forces in the Dominican Republic had the mission of establishing 
the neutral zone, but that more forces would be required to properly execute the mission. 
These forces would consist of additional Marines and two battalions from the 82nd 
Airborne Division. 
The following day President Johnson announced that Cuban trained revolutionaries 
had taken over a democratic revolution. He announced that another 4,500 troops would 
be deployed to prevent "the establishment of another Communist government in the 
Western Hemisphere."17 On May 6, the OAS passed a resolution creating its first 
multinational force. The mission of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was defined 
as "cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, 
maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and the 
establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning 
of democratic institutions."18 The resolution assisted in deflecting the criticism in the UN 
that the US had acted unilaterally in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation. 
16Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in 1965. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 
1966), p. 80. 
"Ibid., p. 81. 
18Palmer, Bruce, Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965. 








The US force, which reached a peak strength of 22,500 on May 10, was 
responsible for manning the International Security Zone (ISZ). On May 24, the first 
patrols by the IAPF began and the US began drawing down its troop commitment by 
redeploying the Marine forces. On June 6, the last Marines departed and the US 
commitment was down to around 12,000, with about 1,800 Latin American troops.19 The 
IAPF supported the provisional government and engaged any element which attempted to 
disrupt the electoral process. The ISZ allowed the IAPF to adopt a neutral position by 
forcing a separation of the Loyalist and Constitutionalist factions. While a political 
compromise was being worked out, the IAPF provided humanitarian assistance to 
Dominican civilians. 
On August 31, the OAS brokered Act of Reconciliation and Institutional Act 
established an interim government under Hector Garcia-Godoy pending elections to be held 
in June 1966. The IAPF now shifted their emphasis from neutrality to active support of 
the provisional government. The IAPF prevented an attempted coup and was used to stop 
outbreaks of violence throughout the country. In June 1966, the IAPF was used to 
monitor the elections and Joaquin Balaguer won the presidency. On September 27, 1966, 
the last American soldiers departed the Dominican Republic. As a result of the US-led 
operation, the Dominican Republic has remained relatively stable for almost 30 years. 
UNIPOM 
On September 23, 1965, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission 
(UNIPOM) was established to facilitate the cessation of border conflict. The mandate 
called for the supervision of the cease fire along the India-Pakistan border and the 
withdrawal of both parties from the border. The mission was a corollary to UNMOGIP 
and did not affect the disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir. The US did not contribute 
to this mission. 






On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel. The USSR 
supported the Arab invasion with diplomatic encouragement and then through the airlift 
of military supplies. On October 13, Israel offered a cease-fire in place, which was 
rejected by Egypt. In response to a request by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, the US 
immediately began to transport equipment and supplies to Israel to assist in bringing a 
quick end to the fighting. Jordan entered the war on October 14, but the Arab advance 
was brought to a halt and Israel began to counterattack. 
By October 20, Israel had plunged deep into Arab territory and Saudi King Faisal 
announced an oil embargo on the US. The USSR and the US brokered a cease-fire 
resolution and presented it to the Security Council on October 21. When fighting 
continued, Egypt requested that a joint US-USSR force to compel an Israeli withdrawal. 
The USSR threatened to intervene unilaterally and the US placed all forces on Defense 
Condition Three.20 The US conducted diplomatic missions between Egypt and Israel and 
was able to broker a cease-fire that was acceptable to both sides. On October 25, the 
United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was established to supervise the cease-fire. 
UNEF II exempted the permanent members of the Security Council from 
contributing troop contingents. A Soviet desire to contribute to the operation resulted in 
a compromise in which the US and the USSR both contributed thirty-six MOs through 
UNTSO, which assisted in the establishment of UNEF II.21 UNEF II had a mandate "(1) 
to supervise the implementation of Resolution 340, which called for an immediate and 
complete cease-fire in positions occupied by the respective forces on October 22, 1973; 
(2) to prevent he reoccurrence of the fighting and to cooperate with the International 
20Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force II:   1973-1979," in Durch, et al., pp. 134- 
135. 
21Finger, Seymour M., "The Maintenance of Peace," in Kay, David A., The Changing 









Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian activities; and (3) to operate with 
the cooperation of UNTSO. "22 
C.   DOCTRINE 
The subjection of military action during war was a new experience for the military. 
Within Army doctrine, this type of warfare was first called "wars of limited objective".23 
With the publication of the 1954 Field Service Regulations, the Army began its evolution 
towards the concept of a "spectrum of conflict" and the limiting of the application of 
military power to obtain political objectives. Victory was reevaluated, "Victory alone as 
an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the 
realization of national objectives."24 
The 1962 Field Service Regulations introduced the "Spectrum of War," which 
defined cold war as "the application of national power short of military force" and general 
war as "the unrestricted application of military force"; the middle of the spectrum was 
defined as limited war and "represents the wide range of conflicts between cold war and 
general war."25 The concept of limited war clearly stated that "military operations must 
be conducted within the limits established by national policy."26 
Chapter 12, "Situations Short of War," is the beginning of the doctrinal 
development of peace operations. The missions included shows of force, truce 
enforcement, International Police actions, and legal occupations.   The imperative of 
22Ghali, Mona, "United Nations Emergency Force II:   1973-1979," in Durch, et al., p. 
137. 
23Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5r Field Service Regulations:  Operations. 
(Washington, DC:  USGPO, 27 September 1954), p. 6. 
M¥M 100-5r Field Service Regulations:  Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 19 
February 1962), p. 7. 
25Ibid, p. 4. 










23De.part  · ,
24F , · ,
25Ibi , . . 
26Ibi
minimal force was clear. "The commander must use the minimum amount of force 
required to accomplish force objectives and discontinue the use of force when it is no 
longer required."27 The genesis of the idea that Army personnel could accomplish 
missions in any environment can be found in the statement, "The sound discipline of 
combat units is the best possible basis for the special troop training required for operations 
in situations short of war."28 Additional training was to include orientation on the force 
mission, local customs, conditions in the area of operations, security procedures, and 
relationships with the civilian populace. The psychological impact of these operations was 
recognized and was to be considered in the planning for such operations. 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam forced the military to revise doctrine and establish 
a new type of operation. Stability Operations were defined as "That type of internal 
defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces 
to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government 
can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved."29 The 1967 
Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations was primarily focused on the training of Host 
Country (HC) forces to conduct operations efficiently in the given operational 
environment. However, it also stated that "U.S. advisory assistance may include 
providing and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for HC 
forces."30 
The next doctrinal revision placed military actions within stability operations firmly 
under civilian control. "At the HC national level, the U.S. Ambassador or the principle 
U.S. diplomatic officer is primarily responsible for insuring that all U.S. military, 
27Ibid.,p. 156. 
28Ibid.,p. 161. 
29FM 31-73 Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations  (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 












economic, social, and political assistance programs in the country are integrated and 
coordinated. "31 The minimal application of combat power was stressed in the conduct of 
stability operations. Operations which could be considered peace operations included 
populace and resource control operations (checkpoints, controlling refugees and displaced 
persons, protecting resource storage areas), frontier operations (deny exfiltration or 
infiltration of insurgents, refugee control, military civic action), disarming the population 
(during or after conflict), and protection of voters and polls (to ensure a valid election). 
Although this manual was designed to battle insurgencies and revolution, it contained trace 
elements of what would later become peace operations. 
The 1970 version of Military Police Operations in Stability Operations provided 
"a specific guide for providing combat support and combat service support to U.S. 
elements engaged in stability operations and for the organization, training, and 
employment of military police personnel and units assigned to train and advise host 
country (HC) civil, military, and paramilitary police."32 Chapter 3, "Training and 
Advisory Assistance," provides guidance on how to train a HC police force and Appendix 
E, "Police Training Subjects and Scope," details training subject matters for HC police. 
These missions were conducted by UN forces in the Congo. 
The 1970 version of Base Defense (Test) provided guidance on how to establish and 
operate base defense within stability operations. The parallels to peace operations are clear 
in the operational environment, which includes US forces as guests in a HC, lack of unity 
of command between the nations involved in the operation, and the absence of declared 
war.   The difficulty of command and control is highlighted "when there is no control 
31FM 31-23 Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 8 
December 1967), p. 33. 
32FM 19-50 Military Police in Stability Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 4 
February 1970), p. 1-1. 
24 
i , l,  liti l  r s i  t  tr  r  i t r t   
i t . 31  i l ti   t r  tr  i  t  t f 
t  .  l   i   ti   
 t , lli     
 i    , ti    i  
      





31F  t   ,
32  - ilit li  i  t ilit  , i ,
. - . 
8. 
organization such as the United Nations or a special treaty organization. "33 This statement 
represents a link between peace operations and stability operations. 
The 1972 version of Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations provides doctrine 
"applicable to Army forces involved in border security operations: specifically to cold war 
conflict, to include stability operations; generally, to limited war."34 This manual 
highlights the political factors and states that "commanders must be acutely aware of the 
political implications and overall sensitivity of their missions."35 Restrictions would 
include rules of engagement which would limit the use of force, equipment, and firepower. 
Special training included police-type patrolling, operation of checkpoints, and observation 
post techniques. The psychological pressures caused by infrequent contact with the enemy 
and the need for constant vigilance were noted as a potential problem that leaders would 
need to consider when planning these operations. 
The 1972 revision of Stability Operations added a chapter on training requirements 
for advisors and a paragraph on border operations. The primary mission of stability 
operations was given to Special Action Forces, with a tiered response from brigade-size 
backup forces from overseas and than brigade-size forces from US based forces. 
Additional changes included the removal of population relocation and transfrontier pursuit 
missions from doctrine. This manual was the last doctrinal guidance prior to the removal 
of combat soldiers from Vietnam on March 29, 1973. 
33 FM 31-81 (Test) Base Defense. (Washington.D.C: USGPO, 17 March 1970), p. 2- 
34FM 31-55 Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 
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D.   MILITARY LITERATURE 
The first article of interest was published in 1951 and discussed the role of the 
Army in Korea from 1945 - 1949.36 Occupation duty in Korea consisted of controlling the 
demarcation line, processing refugees, and repatriating prisoners of war. The Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) included avoiding conflicts, withdrawing from hostile fire, and firing 
only in self-defense. The parallels to peace operations are clear, but are not made by the 
author. 
In 1953 LTC Cilley discussed the role of UN MILOBs and the need to train US 
officers to accomplish this mission.37 He posited that these mission were consistent with 
US policy objectives and that officers selected should believe in the UN and possess the 
personal qualities required to operate in this difficult environment. He concluded that the 
use of UN MILOBs would continue to grow and that the US should consider training 
officers to participate prior to their actual assignment. 
In 1964, Chief of Staff of the Army Johnson wrote: 
Some of these peace-keeping or stability operations amounted to full 
participation in a limited war, as in Korea. Others included sizeable 
participation in an advisory role in active warfare, as in Vietnam. Still 
others involved the occasional sharing of combat tasks by teams of U.S. 
military advisors and instructors, as in Greece, in the Philippines or in 
Laos; and a few were accompanied by no fighting at all and involved only 
the presence of organized military force, as in Lebanon or in Thailand.38 
This is the first reference to the Army participating in peace-keeping operations, but the 
breadth of the operations cited reflects a rather broad definition. 
36Gayle, John, "Korea - Honor Without War," Military Review, January 1951, pp. 55- 
62. 
37Cilley, George E., "The Role of the United Nations Military Observer," Military 
Review, February 1953, pp. 25-31. 









In 1965, General Johnson wrote that he believed the Army "would continue to be 
called on for peacekeeping or stability operations and called the Dominican Republic 
operation a 'full scale stability operation.' "39 Once again, the definition of peacekeeping 
was very broad and included the "semi-conventional war" in Vietnam. Peacekeeping 
included an unlimited range of landpower missions to prevent the expansion of 
Communism. LTG Palmer wrote about the Dominican Republic operation in the 
following article, but did not place it within an operational category.40 He said the US 
mission was to establish the ISZ, to provide assistance to civilians, and to establish stable 
conditions to ensure a democratic regime. He described the forming of the IAPF and the 
combat missions which they accomplished to ensure stability within the country. 
In 1971, Secretary of the Army Froehlke outlined his objectives for the Army as 
it carried out its "peace mission."41 He did not provide a definition of what a "peace 
mission" was. The following year, he stated that his objectives had not changed for the 
"Army as it carries out its peace-keeping mission."42 He stated that peace-keeping "is our 
one reason for being, our one and only goal. "43 He did not provide a definition of peace- 
keeping in either article. 
During this epoch there were eleven other references to peace operations. Nine 
described UN operations,44 one described the need for a Inter-American Peace Force,45 and 
39Johnson, "Subversion and Insurgency:  Search for a Doctrine," Army, November 
1965, pp. 40-42. 
^Palmer, Bruce JR. "The Army in the Dominican Republic," Army, November 1965, 
pp. 43-44. 
41Froehlke, Robert F., "The Key Words:  Involvement and Teamwork," Army, 
October 1971, pp. 16-18. 
42Froehlke, "Peace-keeping With Pride and Integrity," Army, October 1972, pp. 16-19. 
43Ibid., p. 19. 
'"See "United Nations Emergency Force," Military review, August 1960, p. 72; 
















one described military civic action programs.46 None of these articles implicitly discussed 
doctrinal implications for the Army in peace operations. The successful operations in 
Lebanon and the Dominican Republic did not receive very much attention and were only 
loosely linked to a broad concept of peacekeeping. 
E.   SUMMARY 
The first epoch was characterized by the use of the UN by the US to accomplish 
national security objectives. A congruence of objectives between the US and the UN 
assisted US foreign policy. The objective of the US was to prevent or contain the spread 
of Communism through collective security. This included providing economic, political, 
and military assistance to countries which requested help. The objective of the UN was 
to prevent or contain conflict to ensure world peace and security. The UN used 
negotiation, mediation, unarmed observers, armed peacekeepers, and armed forces in an 
attempt to accomplish its goals. The US could ensure that the UN was a useful tool to 
accomplish its goals because of its veto in the Security Council and the fact that the 
majority of countries within the General Assembly supported the US. 
The UN established twelve operations during this time period. With the exception 
of ONUC, the mandates were limited in scope and manpower. Only two of the operations 
"The United nations and the Congo Crisis," Military Review, November 1965, pp. 50-57; 
LTC Corvino, Joseph M., "UN Peace Forces and International Law," Military review, 
October 1966, pp. 8-18; Bunche, Ralph J., "Toward a Secure Peace," Army Digest, June 
1969, p. 29; Harbottle, Michael N., "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," Military Review, 
September 1969, pp. 43-59; Oliveira, Kleber F., "Can a Peace-keeping Force be a Guest 
Force?", Military review, April 1970, pp. 94-98; Sheikh, Ahmed, "The International 
Soldier," Military review, June 1970, pp. 80-90; and Chopra, Maharaj K., "Peacemaking in 
the Indochina States," Military review, July 1970, pp. 70-76. 
45Barrett, Raymon J., "Inter-American Peace Force," Military review, May 1967, pp. 
85-91. 
46Glick, Edward B., "Military Civic Action: Thorny Art of the Peace Keepers," Army, 
September 1967, pp. 67-70. 
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(UNYOM, UNIPOM) were conducted without substantial US assistance. UNYOM was 
possible because of the US brokered agreement which established the conditions for its 
implementation. The US refrained from providing direct support because of a temporary 
thaw in relations with the USSR. Assistance to UNIPOM was hindered by the military 
assistance provided to India. The USSR brokered the cease-fire which made the operation 
possible. The US participated directly in four operations (UNSCOB, UNTSO, 
UNMOGIP, UNEF II), providing MILOBs. It led the enforcement action in Korea and 
provided monetary and transport assistance to the other seven operations. The US also 
conducted operations in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon outside of the auspices of 
the UN. These were essentially unilateral peace operations conducted under the 
operational category of stability operations. 
American involvement in South East Asia forced the Army to develop doctrine to 
support the political goal of containment. The development of stability operations 
provided a coherent doctrine, but the concept was never more than a secondary concern. 
The war in Vietnam was fought as a conventional war and applications of stability doctrine 
were never fully supported by the senior military officers directing the action. A doctrinal 
template was developed, but was not institutionalized. The process of objectification was 
never completed and the Army continued to conduct operations in Vietnam with 
conventional doctrine adapted only slightly from World War II. The lessons that should 
have ben learned from the successful operations in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic 
were ignored in favor of a strategy of annihilation in Vietnam. 
Peacekeeping was linked directly to stability operations by Chief of Staff of the 
Army Johnson. The Army's view of peacekeeping at this time included any operation 
short of general war which assisted in the attainment of peace on US terms. UN 
operations were described by various authors, but little thought was given to whether the 
Army would participate and what form that participation would encompass. The tacit 
agreement in the UN against permanent Security Council members participating in 
peacekeeping operations reinforced the belief that the Army would not be called upon to 
29 
conduct these operations.  The doctrinal trace for peace operations occurred during this 
epoch, but the process of constructing of the meaning of peace operations did not. 
30 
m.  AIRLAND BATTLE TO THE MFO:  1974-1982 
A. POLITICAL FACTORS 
In early 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger promulgated a new doctrine of 
flexible nuclear options. The aim was "to provide the President with a wider set of much 
more selective targeting options so as to shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of 
risk. "47 The new doctrine was not a war-winning strategy, but instead sought to influence 
Soviet intentions and increase US deterrence capability. Later that year, the Vladivostok 
accords appeared to indicate Soviet acceptance of nuclear parity in a SALT II treaty. In 
1975, through the Helsinki accords, the US recognized the USSR occupation of Eastern 
Europe in exchange for a commitment from the Soviet leadership to respect human rights 
in the USSR. The Ford administration continued to follow the Nixon doctrine despite the 
1975 North Vietnam conquest of South Vietnam and the heavy assistance of Cuban 
military forces in Angola. 
The Carter administration took office convinced that detente should be continued, 
but refined. He believed that the US had overcome its extreme fear of communism and 
wanted to construct a viable relationship with the USSR. Believing this was possible, he 
sought to lead the US in the international arena by making the respect for human rights a 
pillar of his foreign policy. Economic and arms assistance to the lesser powers declined 
through this linkage to human rights. The diplomatic aspect of national security policy 
was emphasized and the military component was focused towards Europe and NATO. The 
mediating role that Carter played in bringing about the Camp David Accords demonstrated 
the administrations reliance on diplomacy in the international arena. Carter virtually 
ignored Soviet-sponsored military actions throughout the world, including the Cuban airlift 
of troops to Ethiopia in 1977-1978. 
47Litwak, Robert S., Detente and the Nixon Doctrine. New York, NY:  Cambridge 






The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a reevaluation of national security policy 
and the introduction of the Carter doctrine. In an abrupt shift, Carter proclaimed that the 
US would be willing to use military force in the Persian Gulf if outside powers interfered, 
withdrew the SALT II treaty from the ratification policy, imposed a grain embargo on the 
USSR, pushed through a law requiring registration for the draft, and withdrew the US 
team from the Moscow Olympics. The seizure of hostages in Iran and the failed military 
rescue attempt contributed to the election of Ronald Reagan. 
Reagan took office convinced that years of neglect had negatively affected the 
military strength of the US. To stop Soviet expansion, a revitalized containment strategy 
was required. To do this, he concentrated on a defense buildup which focused on modern 
military equipment. He pushed through the strategic defense initiative (SDI) in an attempt 
to find a way to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. Although manpower increased only 
slightly, Reagan emphasized the need for increased strategic deployability through light 
ground forces and strategic airlift. The administration reversed the Carter policy on 
economic and arms assistance, believing they would assist other countries in achieving 
national security objectives and contribute to regional stability. The deadlock in the UN 
caused by increased Cold War competition convinced Reagan of the necessity for a more 
unilateral approach to foreign policy. 
B. OPERATIONS 
UNEF II 
On January 18, 1974, Egypt and Israel signed their first disengagement agreement. 
The US agreed to perform overflights at regular intervals to ensure that both sides were 
adhering to the agreement. The second disengagement agreement was signed on 
September 4, 1975, in Geneva and provided for a ground surveillance unit manned by US 
civilians, the Sinai Field Mission (SFM). The unit operated in the strategic Gidi and Mitla 
passes, the two main ground routes through the Sinai. After Sadat's historical visit to 
Israel in November 1977, Carter invited the heads of state to Camp David for bilateral 
talks. As a result of this effort, the two sides signed a peace treaty in March 1979.  Fear 
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of a Soviet veto precluded the Security Council from renewing UNEF II's mandate and 
the SFM remained as the only monitoring "force" while the US formed a multilateral 
peacekeeping force. 
UNDOF 
The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was the second 
peacekeeping operation in the Middle East following the October War. The US mediated 
a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, which resulted in Security Council 
Resolution 350. The force had a mandate "to ensure the observance of the cease-fire; to 
supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement with respect to the absence of 
military forces in the area of separation and the restriction of arms and personnel in the 
Syrian and Israeli areas of limitation; and to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 
338. "48 The agreement signed by Israel and Egypt precluded permanent members of the 
Security Council from participating in the operation. 
UNIFIL 
After the Lebanese civil war ended in October 1976, the Lebanese government was 
unable to establish firm control in southern Lebanon. A hodgepodge of nationalist and 
extremist groups operated in the area, dominated by the PLO. Raids into Israel by the 
PLO were followed by intensive retaliation by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). On 
March 11, 1978, the PLO conducted a commando raid which killed 37 and wounded 76 
Israelis.49 The IDF responded with Operation Litani, an armed incursion into southern 
Lebanon on March 14-15. On March 19, the US proposed and the UN adopted Security 
Council Resolution 425, establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL). UNIFIL's mandate was to "(1) confirm an immediate and Israeli cease-fire and 
withdrawal from Lebanese territory; (2) restore international peace and security; and (3) 
48Ghali, Mona, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in Durch, et al., p. 
155. 
49United Nations, The Blue Helmets. (New York, NY:  United Nations Department of 







ensure the restoration of Lebanese governmental authority and its territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, and territorial independence. "50 
UNIFIL encountered many problems from the very beginning of the operation. 
The factions involved continued to conduct operations against each other and UNIFIL 
could do little to halt the violence. On June 5, 1982, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 508, charging all parties to cease military activities in Lebanon no later than 
0600 hours on June 6. Within hours of the mandated cease-fire, Israel invaded Lebanon 
and moved through the UNIFIL sector. Encouraged by their initial success, the IDF 
continued its offensive to the outskirts of Beirut, trapping the remnants of the PLO inside 
the city. On July 16, Saudi Arabia and Syria requested US assistance in arranging a PLO 
withdrawal from Beirut. 
MFO 
When the UNEF II mandate expired, Israel made it clear that a joint Israeli- 
Egyptian or multinational peacekeeping force was required in the Sinai. Egypt rejected 
the former and asked the US to honors its commitment and establish a multinational 
force.51 David Segal was one of the numerous social scientists whose advice was sought 
in the formation of the MFO. He offered four suggestions, all of which were ignored by 
the planners. First, he suggested that the US not participate militarily. Second, that a unit 
be specially formed and trained for duty. Third, that a Military Police battalion be used. 
And fourth, that an elite unit not be used. Army Chief of Staff General Meyer believed 
that "the best soldiers would make the best peacekeepers" and decided that the commitment 
would be rotated between battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st 
Airborne Division (Air Assault).52 
50Ghali, Mona, "United nations Interim Force in Lebanon:  1978-Present," in Durch, et 
al., p. 187. 
51Tabory, Mala, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986), p. 7. 
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As the US continued to support the Camp David Accords through the SFM and 
aerial surveillance, the political, administrative and financial structure of the MFO was 
developed. On December 29, 1981, President Reagan signed Public Law No. 97-132, 
authorizing US participation in the MFO.53 The MFO began their deployment on March 
10, 1982, were in place by March 20, and assumed duty at 1300 hours on April 25, 
1982.54 
The main objective of the MFO is to verify the adherence to the Israeli-Egyptian 
Peace Treaty signed at Camp David on September 17, 1978. It is a neutral force with a 
clear mandate covering its mission to observe, detect, and then notify the two countries 
of any violations concerning the agreed to limit of armed forces in the four zones of the 
Sinai Peninsula. The soldiers are armed with defensive weapons and act as a deterrent to 
a resumption of hostilities by their physical presence. In the thirteen years that the force 
has been in existence, there have been no reports of soldiers cooperating with one state at 
the expense of the other and no soldier has been killed by shots fired in anger. 
MNFI 
The Multinational Force (MNF I) was deployed from July-September 1982, 
consisting of US Marines and troops from France and Italy. The mandate of the force was 
to ensure the safe removal of the PLO from Lebanon. Each country was in Lebanon 
through bilateral agreements with the Lebanese government and functioned together 
through cooperation.55 The MNF escorted over 14,000 PLO soldiers to safety by land 
and sea, and then disbanded on September 10.56 Four days later, Bashir Gemayel was 
assassinated and factional violence resulted in the death of hundreds within the Palestinian 
53Tabory, p. 14. 
54Tabory, p. 15. 
"Gregory, Frank, "The Multinational Force - Aid or Obstacle to Conflict resolution?", 
Conflict Studies no. 170, 1984, p. 24. 
56Bolger, Daniel P.  Savage Peace. (Novato, CA:  Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 173-74. 
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refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla. Amin Gemayal, Bashir's brother, was chosen as the 
new president and he immediately requested assistance from the US and Europe. 
MNFTI 
The second Multinational Force (MNF II) was formed on September 25, 1982 and 
consisted of the same countries as MNF I. In February 1983, a small British contingent 
joined the forces. The mandate of the force was "to provide an interposition force at 
agreed to locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the 
Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut 
area."57 The US contingent of Marines numbered over 1,750 and had the mission of 
protecting the international airport. The MNF II did not have a multinational force 
commander and relied on cooperation as a method of command and control. The force 
was not considered to be a peacekeeping force by the administration or the military, but 
was viewed as having a mission of "presence. "58 
The MNF II initially enjoyed the limited support of the factions involved. The 
Israelis withdrew from the Beirut area to fortified positions in the south. The Marines 
conducted foot patrols in the area outside their perimeters and began to train Lebanese 
soldiers, outfitting them with USMC camouflage uniforms. The operation functioned 
without serious incident throughout the rest of 1982. 
C. DOCTRINE 
In November 1974, the Army eliminated the concept of stability operations with 
the publication of FM 100-20 Internal Defense and Development: US Army Doctrine. 
This manual placed the primary burden of responsibility for internal defense and 
development (IDAD) on the host country, in line with the Nixon doctrine. Parallels to 
peace operations can be found in the section on Border Operations. Tasks included 
security of populated areas, operations of authorized points of entry, refugee control, 
"Gregory, Frank, p. 25. 








enforcement of movement and travel restrictions, reconnaissance and surveillance, and 
barrier and denial operations.59 Operational guidelines included the desire to minimize 
violence. Humanitarian assistance was to be administered by the Agency for International 
Development (AID), the Department of State, and the Department of Agriculture. 
The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 Operations eliminated the Spectrum of War and 
proclaimed that AirLand Battle doctrine would apply "to fight and win in battles, large or 
small, against whatever foe, wherever we may be sent to war. n6° The Army declared that 
"The war in the Middle East in 1973 might well portend the nature of modern battle."61 
The Army's keystone manual in effect declared that the Army's only mission was to fight 
the land battle. 
The 1981 edition of FM 100-20 was retitled Low Intensity Conflict. This manual 
focused on how to fight and win in situations short of war. Under the category of "Other 
Operations", the Army recognized peacekeeping for the first time. "PEACEKEEPING 
FORCE. The United States may be called upon to provide support to a UN or treaty 
organization effort to establish a regional peacekeeping force in a contested area involving 
TWO OR MORE NATIONS."62 This definition of peacekeeping was not expanded upon 
in the manual and no guidance was given on how to train or prepare for an operation, nor 
on how to conduct an operation. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 The AirLand Battle and Corps 86, published in March 
1981, reinforced the message that the Army's primary focus would remain on winning the 
land battle. "The concept emphasizes the all too frequently ignored or misunderstood 
lesson of history-that once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of 
59FM 100-20 Internal Defense and Development:  US Army Doctrine. (Washington, 
DC:  USGPO, November 1974), pp. 5-16 - 17. 
^FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, July 1976), p. 1-1. 
61Ibid.,p. 2-2. 
62FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, January 1981), p. 









r --t  
59F y u , 
60F ,  ,  . 
61Ibi , p.
62F  ,    ,  
military aims, military forces must win something-else there will be no basis from which 
political authorities can bargain to win politically. "63 AirLand Battle dealt primarily with 
modern, well equipped forces, but there was no limitation placed on the concept. Once 
again, no other operational environment other than large-scale conventional war was 
recognized. 
The final manual published during this epoch was the 1982 version of FM 100-5 
Operations. The manual stressed that "An Army's operational concept is the core of its 
doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, 
procedures, organizations, support, equipment, and training. The concept must be broad 
enough to describe operations in all anticipated circumstances."64 The manual included a 
chapter on contingency operations. "In support of national policy, the NCA directs 
contingency operations involving US forces overseas. Usually such operations are urgent. 
The size of a contingency force, its mission, and the area of operations vary. "65 No 
examples of contingency operations are given, but the manual clearly dictates that AirLand 
Battle doctrine will apply. Thus, the AirLand Battle concept was the only doctrinal 
guidance for the conduct of military operations within the Army's keystone manual. 
D. MILITARY LITERATURE 
The majority of the articles published during this epoch debated AirLand Battle and 
the changes to doctrine through the implementation of this new concept. The first of six 
articles relating to peace operations was published in 1975.66 COL Coverdale and CPT 
Snyder began their article with a hypothetical requirement for US peacekeepers to prevent 
63TRADOC Pamphlet. 525-25 The AirLand Battle and Corps 86. (Ft. Monroe, VA: 
TPvADOC, March 1981), p. 2. 
^FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, August 1982), p. 2-1. 
65Ibid., p. 16-1. 
66Coverdale, Craig G. & Snyder, Albert J., "The Army as Keeper of Mideast Peace," 
Army, November 1975, pp. 11-17. 
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a war between Israel and Egypt, after the Soviets declare that they have dispatched 
peacekeepers. They explain the US aversion to peacekeeping as a means to keep the 
Soviets out of peacekeeping, fearing they would use it to expand their influence into a 
region. They note that peacekeeping was considered a stability operation, but that stability 
operations no longer exist and that there is currently no doctrinal guidance published. 
They believe that Special Forces are the best units for peacekeeping, followed by a Ranger 
battalion and then a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division. 
They believed that the obvious steps to be taken included developing doctrine for 
UN peacekeeping operations, qualifying a group of officers for this type duty, orientating 
the military towards these types of operations, and the development of specialized 
peacekeeping equipment. The quote Secretary of Defense Schlesinger as stating "We're 
not putting together a defense establishment that is primarily directed toward protecting 
the United States against an overland attack. The defense establishment of the United 
States is designed to provide worldwide military balance and a vision of the U.S. role. "67 
They conclude by stating that "Clearly a peacekeeping role for the U.S. Army could be 
an essential element in this new vision and a means of maintaining the worldwide military 
balance."68 
The next article was published in December 1975 and discussed the structural 
strengths and weaknesses of UNEF II.69 Pelcovits defined peacekeeping as "a military 
presence auxiliary to political action, designed to hold the line for peaceful adjustment by 
imposing restraints on the will to resume fighting. "70 He believed that the most important 
lesson to be learned from the Middle East is that peacekeeping has a short half-life, that 
67Ibid., p. 17. 
68Ibid., p. 17. 
69Pelcovits, N.A., "UN Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict," Military 
Review, December 1975, pp. 32-48. 










diplomatic initiatives are essential to maintain an effective operation. He notes the 
importance of superpower support, but does not discuss the merits of deploying US 
peacekeeping contingents. 
Two articles addressed the Sinai Field Mission. In November 1977, CPT McCay 
discussed the SFM and its impact on Middle East peace initiatives.71 The article explained 
the mission of the SFM and the respect for US impartiality which has resulted from the 
operation. In December 1979, MAJ Napoliello discussed the promising possibility of the 
successful use of a similar force on the Golan Heights.72 He believed that the SFM created 
an atmosphere of trust between Egypt and Israel and demonstrated America's resolve for 
peace in the region. Neither author addressed the issue of US military forces in 
peacekeeping operations. 
In December 1977, Major Wise proclaimed that peacekeeping had become a 
potential assignment for all armies, including the US Army.73 He noted that 
"Peacekeeping, as practiced in recent UN operations, is nonviolent, neutral, third-party 
intervention...it is always 'noncoercive and impartial'. It is not 'peace enforcement', the 
term now being applied to a Dominican Republic-type operation. "74 He does not address 
the issue of whether the US should contribute to peacekeeping operations, believing that 
a doctrine for such operations must be developed first. The best structure for the force is 
a mechanized battalion with three platoons of APCs and proper support augmentation. 
Training should consist of adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs), the rapid 
and secure movement of units to establish outposts and zones, and individual skills 
including construction of defensive positions and an understanding of local customs and 
71McKay, Karen, "Watch on the Sinai," Army, November 1977, pp. 18-25. 
72Napoliello, David A., "The Sinai Field Mission:  A Step Towards Peace in the 
Middle East," Parameters, December 1979, pp. 20-27. 
73Wise, James C, "How Not to Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for a UN 
Peacekeeping Operation," Military Review, December 1977, pp. 20-31. 
74Ibid.,p. 20. 
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the history of the situation. He urges the use of a simulation developed by the 
International Peace Academy (IPA) which would help leaders and staff officers in the 
planning and execution of peacekeeping operations. 
The final article published in this epoch was in October 1980 by LTC Child.75 
Child endorsed the IPA definition of peacekeeping "the prevention, containment, 
moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium 
of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using 
multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."76 He 
defines peace-enforcing as "the imposition of peace by an outside force, either unilaterally 
or multilaterally. "77 He then turns his attention to Latin America and discusses the 
fourteen peacekeeping or peaceobserving efforts in the Inter-American system. He notes 
that the Dominican Republic Operation was the only peace force to be established, but 
doubts that it can be considered a peacekeeping mission. Because of the belief by Latin 
American countries that the US used the OAS as a cover for unilateral interests, he 
believed that the US should only commit logistical support to Latin America. At UN 
level, he believed that the US should only offer diplomatic support to keep the big power 
problems out of peacekeeping efforts. 
E.  SUMMARY 
The second epoch was characterized by a retrenchment in doctrine which initially 
focused completely on AirLand Battle. This was in response to the failure to accomplish 
US objectives in Vietnam and the new national security strategy of the Nixon 
administration. The 1973 War provided a major impetus to AirLand Battle because of the 
ability of the Israelis to fight outnumbered and win against Soviet equipment, a situation 
75Child, John, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System," Military Review, 
October 1980, pp. 40-54. 
76Ibid.,p. 42. 








which NATO faced. LIC became an operational category in 1981 and listed peacekeeping 
as a possible mission, but provided no doctrinal guidance on how to plan or execute the 
mission. LIC itself was a secondary mission which was not mentioned in the 1982 
revision of FM 100-5 Operations. 
The UN established two operations during this time period, both of limited scope 
and manpower. The US participated in one of the operations, providing MILOBs and the 
SFM to UNEF II. There were three peace operations involving multinational forces. The 
MFO was established as a result of the fear of a Soviet veto over extending UNEF II, 
caused by the escalation in the Cold War following Reagan's election. Failure of UNIFIL 
to effectively operate in Southern Lebanon and the subsequent invasion by the IDF was 
the impetus for the formation of the MNF I to remove the PLO from Lebanon. At the 
request of the Lebanese government after President Bashir Gemayal was assassinated and 
the massacres occurred at the refugee camps, the MNF II was established. 
Although there were only six articles discussing peace operations during this epoch, 
the articles began to stress the need for doctrine. Definitions were discussed and basic 
principles for peacekeeping were developed for consideration. Two articles opined on the 
proper force structure for peacekeeping operations and discussed required training, 
believing that the US Army may be called upon to perform peacekeeping missions. 
However, there were no articles published concerning the MFO even though a battalion 
from the 82nd Airborne Division had completed the first rotation in October 1982. 
The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations began during this 
epoch. The deployment of Army units to the MFO represented a commitment to the use 
of peacekeeping to achieve foreign policy objectives. Recognition by a few officers of the 
need for doctrinal guidance represented a belief that the Army may have to conduct peace 
operations in the future. However, the process had only begun. Political guidance was 
not issued, key military leaders were silent and doctrinal guidance was not developed for 
peace operations. 
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IV. UNILATERALISM TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR: 1983-1989 
A. POLITICAL FACTORS 
The Reagan administration demonstrated its disdain for the UN and multilateralism 
through a series of actions that began with the Grenada operation. In the following years 
the administration continued to abandon the traditional policy of multilateral support to 
regional problems. A series of unilateral actions followed, including the bombing of Libya 
and the financing of anti-Communist insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and 
Nicaragua. The US abandoned the UN as a forum for solving international problems and 
a venue for pursuing foreign policy objectives. In October 1983, the Kassebaum 
Amendment authorized the limiting of contributions to the UN. 
In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the USSR. 
As he slowly began to restructure Soviet domestic and foreign policy, the UN became an 
important forum for Soviet declaratory policy. In September 1987, Gorbachev called for 
the enhancement of numerous UN functional areas, including peacekeeping forces. 
Gorbachev stressed the need for mutual security and increased contacts among countries 
to achieve a more active global diplomacy. In a surprise announcement, the USSR 
announced that they would pay their assessment for the UN forces in Lebanon. This 
abrupt change in Soviet foreign policy and the development of a strategy for using the UN 
to achieve Soviet interests highlighted a corresponding lack of US strategy for the use of 
the UN. 
In January 1987, President Reagan published the National Security Strategy of the 
United States. Without specifically citing the UN, He declared that "Multilateral 
diplomacy and participation in international organizations provide an opportunity to 
address global problems and share the task of solving them."78 He asserted that US 
diplomacy had assisted in the enhancement of US goals, including peacekeeping, but did 
78Reagan, Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: 






not state what role peacekeeping played in the attainment of national security objectives. 
However, the reference to multilateralism signalled the gradual shift away from pure 
Unilateralism. A surprise announcement by the USSR came later that year with a 
declaration that reimbursement would begin on the Soviet debts towards the regular budget 
and peacekeeping assessments. 
In January 1988, President Reagan published the second National Security Strategy 
of the United States. He expanded on multilateral diplomacy by specifically citing the UN 
as an international organization which provided a forum for addressing problems. He 
discussed the apparent changes in the USSR, but warned that it was too early for the US 
to let its guard down. In a second reference to the UN, he stated that the US was prepared 
to play a constructive role in the UN to achieve a just settlement in Cambodia. The USSR 
continued to demonstrate its resolve in using the UN as a forum to accomplish foreign 
policy objectives by agreeing to allow the UN to sponsor indirect talks on Afghanistan. 
The USSR then exerted diplomatic pressures on Cuba and Vietnam to reach negotiated 
settlements in Angola and Cambodia. 
As the USSR continued to build bridges through the UN, the US slowly recognized 
that it was losing ground within the UN. In his final speech to the General Assembly in 
September 1988, President Reagan praised the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and 
promised that the US would pay its debts to the UN. President Bush addressed the 
General Assembly in September 1989, but gave only cautious support to the UN. He later 
expanded his support through Thomas Pickering, his UN representative, declaring a desire 
to make better use of the UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery to assist in 
resolution of Third World problems. On November 3, 1989, Assistant Secretary of State 
John Bolton and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky held a joint press conference 
at the UN. Declaring a new commitment to US-USSR cooperation in the UN, they 
sponsored a resolution designed to improve the effectiveness of the UN in maintaining 










The MNF II began to experience problems in the beginning of 1983 as the factions 
began to view the training of the mostly Christian LAF with distrust. On April 18, the US 
embassy was destroyed by a suicide bomber, killing sixty-six. On August 29, the Marines 
suffered their first casualties when two were killed in a mortar attack. Two days later, 
President Reagan ordered an additional 2,000 Marines to the Mediterranean.79 This 
represented the first US escalation in the level of force to be used by the MNF II. 
On September 8, a US Navy warship fired on a reported Druze artillery position 
on the outskirts of Beirut. Five days later, President Reagan authorized the Marines to use 
naval and air support for self-defense or to provide aid to the defense of Western forces 
and the LAF. On September 17, the US shelled Syrian positions in Lebanon with naval 
gunfire. Two days later, Congress authorized US participation in the MNF II for an 
additional eighteen months.80 By this time, the MNF II had lost all vestiges of neutrality 
and was no longer viewed by the factions involved as a legitimate force.81 
Although the situation on the ground had clearly changed, the US continued to 
adhere to the original mandate. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were not changed and 
the Marines did little to improve their defensive posture. On October 23, suicide truck 
bombers attacked the US and French MNF II headquarters and killed 241 Marines and 58 
French soldiers. Four days later, the countries contributing to the MNF II reaffirmed their 
intentions to remain in Lebanon. The MNF II initially increased its level of commitment 
and force within Lebanon, but then gradually began a withdrawal of combat troops which 
ended on March 31, 1984. 
79McDermott, Anthony & Skjelsbaek, Kjell, The Multinational Force in Beirutr 1982- 
1984. (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 191), pp. 272-274. 
80Ibid., pp. 274-275. 











In March 1979, Maurice Bishop seized control of the government of Grenada in 
a bloodless coup. In 1983, Bishop visited the US and divulged that he was worried that 
the government was leaning too far towards the left. Upon his return, he was placed under 
house arrest. On October 18, Bishop was freed by his supporters, but the People's 
Revolutionary Army (PRA) found him and massacred over 100 civilians, executing Bishop 
and three prominent supporters. The US military began to prepare for an operation to 
evacuate over 600 students and 400 civilians from the island, with a possible add-on 
mission to occupy the country and remove the current government. 
On October 23, The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met and 
requested a US intervention. The next day, Chief of State Sir Paul Scoon requested that 
a peacekeeping force from the US and the OECS be established to stabilize the situation. 
These two actions served as justification for Operation Urgent Fury, which commenced 
with assaults by Rangers and Special Forces units on October 25. They were opposed by 
approximately 800 Cubans, 600 PRA, and 2,500 Grenadan militia. By October 28, all 
resistance was subdued and the island was under the control of US forces. Eighteen 
Americans were killed and 116 wounded in the operation. On November 2, the US began 
to redeploy its forces and all had left the island, except a small peacekeeping force of 
about 300, by mid-December.82 
UNGOMAP 
On April 14, 1989, the Geneva Accords were signed by the Afghan and Pakistan 
governments. They provided for noninterference and nonintervention, guarantees by the 
US and USSR, and the voluntary return of refugees. On May 15, the UN Good Offices 
Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was deployed. It consisted of 50 
MILOBs whose mandate was to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the 
implementation of the Geneva Accords. The mission was completed in 1989. 
82Leckie, Robert, The Wars of America. Volume IT:  From 1900-1992. (New York, 
NY: Harper Perennial, 1992), p. 1091. 
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UNIIMOG 
On July 20, 1987, the Security Council passed Resolution 598, which called for 
a cease-fire, a return to internationally recognized boundaries and the observation of a 
cease-fire accord by a UN force. On August 8, the Security Council approved the 
implementation of the resolution and began to deploy an unarmed military observer force. 
The Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) consisted of 350 observers from 26 
countries. Their mandate was to establish cease-fire lines, monitor compliance, supervise 
and verify withdrawals, investigate violations, oversee prisoner of war exchanges, and to 
negotiate with the two sides to obtain a lasting settlement. The force began to drawdown 
after Iraq invaded Kuwait and the mission ended in early 1991. 
UNAVEM T 
The US sponsored peace negotiations which resulted in an agreement for a cease- 
fire and the recognition of Nambian independence in August 1988. Security Council 
Resolution 626 passed on December 20, 1988, creating the UN Angola Verification 
Mission (UNAVEM I). The mandate called for a force of unarmed observers to verify the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola according to the timetable agreed to by Angola 
and Cuba. The force, consisting of 70 MILOBs, verified Cuban withdrawal and 
completed the mission in July 1991, when the last Cubans departed. 
JUST CAUSE 
On February 15, 1988, Manuel Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense 
Forces (PDF) was indicted on drug charges by federal grand juries. One month later, 
President Reagan imposed economic sanctions on the country. In May 1989, Noriega 
overturned the presidential elections and the PDF increased their level of harassment 
towards American military personnel and their dependents. President Bush sent 
reinforcements to the Canal Zone to protect US interests, but the deployment had little 
affect on the situation. On October 3, Giroldi Vega staged an unsuccessful coup, 
resulting in another backlash against US citizens. As tensions rose, the Joint Chiefs of 









On December 15, Noriega was declared Maximum Leader by the National 
Assembly. The assembly then declared a state of war with the US. The next day, the 
PDF killed Marine LT Paez and severely beat a naval officer and his wife who had 
witnessed the killing. President Bush invoked international law regarding the right of a 
state to protect its citizens abroad and the rights within the 1979 Panama Canal treaties for 
the defense of the line of transit and immediately began to deploy forces for an invasion. 
The invasion began on December 20, with multiple attacks by a Joint Task Force 
(JTF). By the end of the day, most of the objectives of Operation Just Cause had been 
accomplished, but Noriega was still on the loose. On December 24, Noriega requested 
and was granted political asylum at the Papal Nunciature. While the standoff continued 
outside the nunciature, US forces continued to secure Panama City. The Dignity 
Battalions caused the greatest problem and the US feared the possibility of a protracted 
guerrilla war. On January 3, 1990, Noriega surrendered and was transported to the US 
for trial, ending all significant resistance by Noriega loyalists. 
UNTAG 
The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was the second peace operation 
which resulted from US sponsored peace negotiations in Africa. UNTAG was authorized 
by Security Council Resolution 435 to supervise Nambian independence. The mandate 
included a more comprehensive settlement plan which included the monitoring of cease- 
fires, elections and the South African Police. Deployed in April 1989, UNTAG consisted 
of a 2,550 man peacekeeping force, 300 MILOBs, and 1,500 civilian police monitors. It 
was the first deployment of a comprehensive force to attempt to achieve political objectives 
through physical presence since ONUC. The key to its success was the desire of the 
interested parties to accept a UN solution. Elections were held in November and the 
operation ended in March 1990. 
ONUCA 
The UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), was authorized on 
November 7, 1989, to verify compliance of the Esquipulas II agreement signed by Costa 
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Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The force, deployed on 
December 7, 1989, consisted of 260 unarmed MOs and a Venezuelan Infantry battalion 
with a mandate to verify that none of the signatories were supporting irregular military 
forces, to supervise a cease-fire and separation of forces, and to supervise the 
demobilization the Contras. The mission ended in January 1992, after the demobilization 
of the Contras was complete. This was the first UN peace operation in the American 
sphere of influence. 
C. DOCTRINE 
The new TRADOC PAM 525-44 proclaimed "Low intensity conflict will continue 
to be an increasing threat to our national security and represents the most likely form of 
conflict the US Army will be involved in for the remainder of the century."83 The 
pamphlet stressed that AirLand Battle doctrine was applicable for all levels of conflict, but 
that the basic tenets would have a broader meaning and that the application of principles 
would be different. Although peacekeeping was not listed as an example of a LIC 
mission, it was discussed. Peacekeeping operations were defined as "Military operations 
conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas 
of potential or actual conflict."84 
The pamphlet stated that the US Army could participate in multilateral or unilateral 
peacekeeping operations. Four special requirements for peacekeeping were listed. First, 
soldiers must possess the skills required for war, but be trained so that his first reaction 
to a situation is to act as an intermediary. Second, an augmented infantry battalion is 
considered the basic unit and should train on patrolling, observation, surveillance, 
investigation, patience and common sense. Third, the requirement to assist isolated 
outposts must be planned for.  And fourth, that a dynamic environment may require the 
83TRADQC PAM 525-44 US Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict. 
(Fort Monroe, VA:  TRADOC, February 1986), Foreword. 
"Ibid., p. G-3. 
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rapid relocation of forces. The missions of cease-fire supervision and law and order 
maintenance were listed as common missions. Training requirements emphasized normal 
military skills, an ability to impartially arbitrate and mediate, and an attitude of firmness, 
fairness, and friendliness. 
The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 Operations hinted at a return to the spectrum of 
conflict by discussing high- and mid-intensity conflict and low intensity conflict in Chapter 
1, "Challenges for the US Army." Within the low intensity conflict section, peacekeeping 
operations were addressed for the first time in the Army's keystone manual. It received 
one paragraph: 
As in the past, the Army will also participate in peacekeeping operations 
which support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in 
an area of armed conflict. Such operations may be unilaterally or 
internationally manned and directed. Whatever the case, they will be 
sensitive and will require a high degree of unit and individual discipline in 
the forces committed. Units of peacekeeping forces use force only in cases 
of self defense.85 
Contingency operations were described as military actions that are taken after 
diplomatic actions have failed or require supplementation to succeed. "Contingency 
operations involving Army forces may provide a rapid show of force in support of a 
threatened ally to deter aggression by a hostile neighbor, react to the invasion of a friendly 
government, protect the property of US nationals, rescue hostages or perform other tasks 
as directed by the NCA."86 The first operation, a show of force, would be considered a 
preventive deployment under the category of preventive diplomacy in FM 100-23 Peace 
Operations. 
85FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, May 1986), p. 5. 
86Ibid.,p. 169. 
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D. MILITARY LITERATURE 
The first article published in this epoch was by MAJ Homan, Royal Netherlands 
Marine Corps.87 Homan asserts that the MFO is the first peacekeeping operation for the 
US. He explains the reasons for the US participation and discusses the mandate, personnel 
strengths, logistical support and communications requirements of the mission. He 
concludes by stating that "in the absence of unamity in the Security Council, a 
peacekeeping force, which is established outside the UN framework but based on 
established principles of international law, can contribute positively to international peace 
and security."88 
Two articles discussed aspects of the MNF II and gave different descriptions of its 
mission. The first article was a critique of the press coverage in Grenada, which lists the 
suicide bombing as a reason for press sloppiness. "The Marines had been very much in 
the hearts and minds of the country because of their peacekeeping performance in Lebanon 
and the tragic explosion that killed more than 230 of them a few days before Grenada. "89 
The second article discussed the bombing and argued that it was an example of 
unconventional warfare and not a terrorist attack. Within the article, the mission of the 
Marines was described as an effort "to help 'stabilize' the political-military chaos that 
prevails there."90 
In October 1984, Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Wickham, wrote an 
article to detail the new challenges that the Army faced.91   He briefly discussed the 
87Homan, Cornelis, "MFO: Peacekeeping in the Middle East," Military Review, 
October 1980, pp. 40-54. 
88Ibid., p. 13. 
89Binder, L., "The Army Was in Grenada, Too," Army, December 1993, p. 15. 
^Simpson, Charles M., "'Paranoia' as Weapon in Unconventional Warfare," Army, 
April 1984, p. 30. 
91Wickham, John A., "Today's Army: Landpower in Transition," Army, October 













contribution of peacekeeping to deterrence and mentions the MFO and observer duty in 
Israel and southern Lebanon as examples. Grenada was described as a "rescue operation" 
which accomplished the mission. He notes that 43% of the Army is forward deployed and 
that the trend is likely to increase as the Army participates in more peacekeeping and 
observer missions. 
There were five articles that debated the merits of LIC doctrine. Three of the 
articles argued that peacekeeping did not belong within LIC doctrine. In 1985, COL 
Paschall argued that LIC was becoming a catchall by including peacekeeping operations, 
a peripheral activity that could obscure the real threat of insurgencies.92 Although he 
claimed that there was no tie between LIC and peacekeeping, he did recognize that there 
was a need to develop peacekeeping doctrine. In 1986, MAJ Zais asserted that the 
definition of LIC was so flawed that it did not even facilitate the development of 
doctrine.93 His objective was to match missions to operational force structure. He 
proclaimed that even though doctrine did not exist, Military Police were the most 
appropriate force for peacekeeping operations. He labeled Grenada a large-scale strike 
operation and the deployment of Marines to Lebanon a show of force.94 In 1987, COL 
Swain argued that LIC doctrine was fundamentally flawed and that two parallel manuals 
were required, one for war (FM 100-5) and the other for operations short of war. He 
asserted that AirLand Battle doctrine was not applicable to operations short of war and that 
FM 100-20 required significant revision to recognize this fact. Peacekeeping and 
humanitarian assistance belonged in a revised FM 100-20, which should abandon the term 
LIC and adopt the term operations short of war. 
92Paschal, Rod, "Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine: Who Needs It?", Parameters, July 
1985, pp. 33-45. 
93Swain, Richard M., "Removing SQUARE Pegs from ROUND Holes: Low Intensity 
Conflict and the Army Doctrine," Military Review, December 1987, pp. 2-15. 
94Zais, Mitchell, "LIC:  Matching Missions and Forces," Military Review, August 
1986, pp. 89-99. 
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A fourth article relating to LIC asserted that peacekeeping belonged within the 
category of LIC. In 1986, LTC Bond asserted that TRADOC PAM 525-44 US Army 
Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict was correct in including peace operations 
in LIC.95 He labeled the MNF in Beirut a peacekeeping force and the Grenada operation 
a strike/raid operation that became a peacekeeping operation after the initial resistance was 
quelled and the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was established. 
In the final article relating to LIC, GEN Galvin explained that new doctrine faces 
difficulties because of the long process of consensus building.96 Within this process, more 
time is spent overcoming resistance than in examining new ideas. He explains how LIC 
doctrine was developed in response to the relatively new phenomena of entire populations 
being involved in war. Although he was referring to the development of LIC doctrine, this 
same process applies to peace operations. 
In 1986, an article described the training which the 2/504th Infantry, 82nd 
Airborne Division received prior to its deployment to the Sinai.97 During a sixteen day 
Army Readiness Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), each platoon conducted night 
raids, called in artillery on snipers, and participated in live-fire exercises. After eight 
rotations to the Sinai, the Army had not yet standardized a training regiment for deploying 
battalions to peacekeeping duty with the MFO. 
Two articles described the missions of the Army and asserted that peacekeeping 
was an important mission. In 1987, an article described the need for a credible landpower 
that could thwart Soviet aggression in the age of nuclear parity.98 Peacekeeping was listed 
95Bond, Peter, "In Search of LIC," Military Review, August 1986, pp. 79-88. 
96Galvin, John, "Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm," Parameters, 
Winter 1986, pp. 2-8. 
97Maestas, Ruben, "Where the Meat Hits the Grinder: Dress Rehearsal for Sinai 
Duty," Army, May 1986, pp. 34-37. 
98Petraeus, David, Kaufman, Daniell & Clark, Asa, "Why an Army?", Army, February 










as a key contribution to international stability and evidence of America's commitment to 
global peace. The peacekeepers with the MFO and observers in Israel and southern 
Lebanon were listed as examples. In 1989, Chief of Staff of the Army, Carl Vuono 
described the changes to the international system and the ability of the Army to respond 
to these changes." He asserted that the Army was prepared to execute any mission, 
including low-intensity conflict and the deployment of peacekeeping forces. He further 
asserted that the Army had successfully committed peacekeeping forces in recent years, 
but did not list the operations. 
The final article of interest was a description of the Dominican Republic 
operation.100 MAJ Greenberg asserted that the operation was initially a strike operation 
which began on April 30, 1965, and ended on May 1. It then transitioned into unilateral 
peacekeeping operation on May 3, ending on May 5. On May 6, it became a multilateral 
peacekeeping operation under the OAS. On August 31, the mandate shifted from 
neutrality to active support of the interim government, lasting until a new President was 
elected and the US departed on September 27, 1966. This is the first time that the 
operation was thoroughly examined in military literature and described as a peacekeeping 
operation. 
E. SUMMARY 
The third epoch was characterized by a temporary withdrawal from a multilateral 
focus which included a strategy for using the UN by the Reagan administration and a 
restructuring of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR under Gorbachev. Reagan 
believed that the US needed to bring pressure on the USSR by stressing the military 
component of national security policy.  Capabilities across the entire spectrum of military 
"Vuono, Carl, "Today's U.S. Army: Trained and Ready In an Era of Change," Army, 
October 1989, pp. 12-32. 
100Greenberg, Lawrence, "The US Dominican Intervention: Success Story," 
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operations were improved to respond to threats throughout the world and the UN was 
essentially abandoned as a useful forum to address international problems. When 
Gorbachev assumed power "the oil boom had vanished and the economy of illusion was 
dead."101 Gorbachev sought to use the UN as a vehicle for changes in foreign policy to 
reduce its commitments abroad and improve its domestic economy. The apparent changes 
ongoing within the USSR influenced the decision of the Reagan administration to renew 
its interest in the UN towards the end of its second term. 
The death of 241 Marines in Lebanon was mitigated politically by President 
Reagan, who took full responsibility. The Grenada operation, which began two days later, 
quickly refocused the public's attention. The UN began to function more effectively in 
the mid-1980s as Cold-war tensions eased. Five new peace operations were initiated from 
1988-1989. The US did not participate in any of the operations except for providing airlift 
to UNTAG. The Panama intervention demonstrated US resolve to conduct unilateral 
interventions when US interests were directly threatened. The establishment of ONUCA 
in the American sphere of influence represented the Bush administration's confidence in 
the abilities of the UN and demonstrated that the administration preferred multilateralism 
to unilateralism. 
Army doctrine began to recognize peace operations as being probable missions. 
The Army began to return to a spectrum of conflict paradigm and stressed that AirLand 
Battle doctrine was appropriate for all levels of conflict. TRADOC PAM 525-44 included 
a broad definition of peacekeeping which could apply to a wide range of missions. FM 
100-5 Operations included peacekeeping for the first time, but gave no doctrinal guidance 
on how to conduct the mission. The operational category of contingency operations was 
expanded slightly and listed possible missions, which included shows of force. Although 
doctrine was beginning to expand, doctrinal guidance on peace operations was essentially 
nonexistent. 
101Remnick, David, Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire. (New York, 
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Peace operations began to receive more attention within the military literature 
during this epoch. Although opinions varied as to which category of military operations 
peace operations belonged within, there was a consensus that the Army would continue to 
be tasked with such missions. The need to develop relevant doctrine to adapt to changes 
in the international system was stressed. Army Chief of Staff's General Wickham (1984) 
and General Vuono (1989) described changes to the international system and opined that 
the likelihood of deploying peacekeeping forces was growing. 
The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations continued during this 
epoch. The Reagan administration began to stress the importance of participating in 
multinational organizations to achieve US interests. The Bush administration continued 
the move towards multilateralism by stressing the need to make better use of the UN 
peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery. Senior Army leaders recognized the 
importance of peace operations. Doctrine began to address peace operations as Army 
missions. Military professionals stressed the need to develop coherent doctrine and force 
structures for the conduct of peace operations. The process had continued, but lack of 
political guidance, the rarity of operations and definitional problems still hindered the 






V. POST - COLD WAR: 1990-1994 
A. POLITICAL FACTORS 
In January 1990, President Bush urged the Congress to provide full funding for the 
UN and to repay the arrears of the regular and peacekeeping budgets over the next five 
years. In the 1990 National Security Strategy, President Bush linked UN peacekeeping as 
a means to reduce the level or likelihood of a US military response to regional problems 
and highlighted the need for an effective force posture in LIC.102 Although recognizing 
the apparent changes in the Soviet Union, he stressed the need to ensure that the military 
force structure could rapidly adapt to any sudden reversal in Soviet policy. 
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and set off a crisis in the Middle East. 
Working through the UN, the administration put together a powerful coalition which 
forcibly removed Iraq from Kuwait. This action served to bolster Bush's faith in the UN 
and within the 1991 National Security Strategy he declared that in the Gulf war "we saw 
the United Nations playing the role dreamed of by its founders."103 He pledged to 
strengthen the UN and to pay all arrearage by 1995, adding that he hoped to see the UN 
play a greater role in peacekeeping. He also pledged to provide humanitarian assistance 
when needed to assist in achieving national security interests. 
In the 1993 National Security Strategy, President Bush declared that military force 
may be used "either to protect our own citizens and interests or at the request of our allies 
or the United Nations."104 He asserted that a revitalized UN deserved US support and that 
the US should strengthen UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities by "taking an 
102Bush, George, National Security Strategy of the United States. (Washington, DC: 
USGPO, February 1990). 
103Bush, George, National Security Strategy of the United States. (Washington, DC: 
USGPO, August 1991), p. v. 
104Bush, George, National Security Strategy of the United States. (Washington, DC: 











active role in the full spectrum of U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and 
support."105 He clearly articulated that the US must improve its capabilities for 
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and capabilities necessary for enforcing peace 
through the UN. To accomplish these objectives, he stated a desire to overhaul the 
security assistance budget and to review the budget for humanitarian assistance and 
peacekeeping to ensure adequate financial support to the UN. 
President Clinton took office convinced that the UN could solve the world's 
problems with proper US leadership. In a move which highlighted the prominence of the 
UN in the administration's foreign policy, Madeleine Albright was made a member of the 
National Security Council. The Clinton administration sought to use the UN as a means 
of conducting assertive multilateralism, "a broader strategy in multilateral forums that 
projects our leadership where it counts."106 In February 1993, President Clinton ordered 
that Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13) be prepared to formulate a policy on 
peacekeeping. The draft envisioned a more active policy on peacekeeping which would 
include placing US forces under the operational control of the UN. 
PRD 13 was scrapped after continuing debate on the future role of the US in Bosnia 
and the death of nineteen soldiers on October 3, 1993, in Somalia. Congress cancelled a 
proposed $175 million contingency fund to cover peacekeeping costs, withheld 10% of its 
regular contribution to the UN, canceled the fourth of five payments to cover arrears, and 
told the President that the US share of peacekeeping had to be cut from 31.7% to 25%.107 
After reviewing PRD 13 and making necessary changes, President Clinton issued 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) in May 1994. 
105Ibid.,p. 7. 
106Berdal, Mats, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," 
Survival, Spring 1994, p. 32. 









PDD 25 states "the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to fight and 
win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful 
tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our 
national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, 
regional security, and economic growth."108 Six major issues are addressed: which peace 
operations to support; reduction of US costs for UN peace operations; command and 
control arrangements; reforming and improving UN capabilities to conduct peace 
operations; reformulating management of US funding for peacekeeping; and developing 
cooperation between the President, the Congress and the American public on peace 
operations. 
The term peace operations within PDD 25 refers to a spectrum of activities from 
peacekeeping to peace enforcement. President Clinton asserted that the US would 
contribute to peace operations when it was in the US national interest and the operation 
met a list of criteria to safeguard US participation. He vowed that US troops would never 
fall under foreign command, but could be under foreign operational control if the situation 
warranted such an action. He urged the Congress to support paying arrears to the UN and 
to adequately budget for peacekeeping operations, which may fall under the DOD budget. 
Finally, he declared that UN peace operations were a valuable tool to accomplish US 
interests and that Congress and the American public must accept and understand their 
importance. 
B. OPERATIONS 
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 
President Bush immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and began to 
work through the UN. Security Resolution 660, passed the day of the invasion, demanded 
an immediate Iraqi withdrawal. Four days later Resolution 661, which invoked Chapter 
108Clinton, Bill, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 





VII, levied mandatory sanctions against Iraq. On November 29, Resolution 678 
authorized the use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. The 
support of the Soviet Union and China represented a new era of cooperation within the 
UN. Forty countries contributed over 200,000 troops to the US-led coalition operating 
under UN authority. 
UNAVEM II 
The UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) was established on May 30, 
1991, with a mandate of verifying the peace agreement, monitoring the cease-fire and 
monitoring the Angolan police. The mandate was later expanded to include the monitoring 
of elections. The force included 350 MILOBs and 126 police observers. After the 
elections were held in September 1992, the civil war resumed when factions refused to 
accept the results. The US provided humanitarian airlift to the operation. 
UNIKOM 
The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was authorized by Security 
Council Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. UNIKOM's mandate is to monitor a 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Kuwait and Iraq to deter violations of the DMZ 
through its presence. The force consists of 300 MILOBs, with the US and Russia 
providing 20 each. The force was authorized under Chapter VI, but other operations in 
the area provide it with implicit military force which could be used. 
PROVIDE COMFORT 
The repression of minorities within Iraq and the flow of refugees into Turkey 
resulted in Security Council Resolution 688 being passed on April 5. The resolution 
condemned Iraq's repression of its civilian population, characterized the flow of refugees 
as a threat to international peace and security, demanded that Iraq halt its repression, 
insisted that Iraq allow international humanitarian organizations immediate access, and 
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demanded that Iraq cooperate with the UN.109 Although the resolution did not invoke 
Chapter VII enforcement measures, the US, Britain, and France formed Combined Task 
Force Provide Comfort as a means of implementing Resolution 688. 
The 3d Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry Regiment (Airborne Battalion Combat 
Team) was redeployed to Iraq on April 26. Their mission was to assist in the 
establishment of temporary refugee camps and to establish and maintain safe areas. As the 
safe areas were expanded, the battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force and functioned 
as an interpositioning force to keep the Iraqis and Kurds separated. The ROE restricted 
the use of force to self-defense and the battalion improvised by using shows of force to 
ensure Iraqi withdrawals. When the safe area was established, the battalion assumed a 
more traditional peacekeeping mission and operated checkpoints, conducted patrols, and 
mediated disputes between Kurdish factions. 
MINURSO 
The UN's Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was created 
on April 29, to implement an agreement which would allow Western Saharans the right 
to choose between independence and a merger with Morocco. MINURSO's mandate was 
to conduct and supervise the referendum and the force had the authority to suspend laws 
and regulations that could impede a fair vote. A refusal to adhere to a cease-fire and 
intransigence by the factions involved have precluded the peaceful settlement envisioned. 
The force consisted of a Canadian infantry battalion, 300 civilian police, and 550 
MILOBs. The US contributed thirty MILOBs . 
ONUSAL 
The UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was the second UN operation in the 
American sphere of influence. In January 1991, the UN opened an office in El Salvador 
to verify the protection of human rights.  ONUSAL was authorized on May 20 to assist 
109Stromseth, Jane, "Iraq," in Damrosch, Lori, Enforcing Restraint: Collective 
Intervention in Internal Conflicts, (New York, NY:  Council on Foreign Relations Press, 






in negotiations for a cease-fire. The size of the force was increased on January 14, 1992, 
and had a mandate to oversee the separation of forces, their assembly in contonement 
areas, and the disposal of weapons.   The US did not contribute to this mission, but 
conducted peacetime engagement missions with the country. 
UNAMIC 
The internal war in Cambodia reached a stalemate in 1989 and the factions 
requested a UN peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, to 
oversee elections, and to supervise the creation of an integrated military. In January 1990, 
the permanent members of the Security Council published an outline of a plan for a UN 
peacekeeping force and UN supervised elections. The four major factions agreed to the 
plan and the UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) began to deploy in late 
1991. UNAMIC established communications with the factions, attempted to resolve cease- 
fire violations, and trained civilians to avoid and report landmines. 
UNTAC 
The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was approved in March 
1992 and the first troops began to arrive two weeks later. UNTAC's mandate was to 
ensure the political neutrality of the governments by assuming authority over both, to 
monitor human rights conditions, and to organize and conduct elections. UNTAC 
consisted of over 22,000 military and civilian personnel. UNTAC encountered numerous 
problems, but successfully held the elections and transferred power to the elected 
government. The US contributed 51 MILOBs and airlift to the operation which ended in 
September 1993. 
UNPRQFQR 
On September 25, 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 713 which 
enacted an arms embargo against Yugoslavia under Chapter VII. On February 21, 1992, 
Security Council Resolution 743 authorized the deployment of the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR I) to establish protected areas and ensure the withdrawal or demobilization 











Resolution 749 approved the full deployment of 13,000 UN peacekeepers to implement 
resolution 743. On May 15, Security Council Resolution 752 demanded an end to Bosnian 
and Croatian interference, an end to ethnic cleansing and noninterference with 
humanitarian relief operations. On May 30, Security Council Resolution 757 enacted 
economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro under Chapter VII. On June 8, 
Security Council Resolution 758 authorized UN forces to secure the Sarajevo airport and 
supervise the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the area. 
On August 13, UNPROFORII was authorized under the provisions of Chapter VII 
to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. On October 9, Security Council 
Resolution 781 banned al military flights within the former Yugoslavia and authorized 
Chapter VII enforcement. Although force was authorized, UNPROFOR I and II were 
hesitant to use it because of their precarious positions. On December 11, Security Council 
Resolution 795 authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Macedonia as a preventive 
measure to contain the conflict. 
The US has participated in the UN missions in the former Yugoslavia from the 
beginning. Navy and AF personnel participate in the embargo and enforcing the no-fly 
zone. The Army deployed a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Zagreb in 1992 and a 
mechanized infantry company to Macedonia in 1993. Special Forces teams have operated 
in the area under US command. The Clinton administration has repeatedly promised to 
send a peacekeeping force of over 20,000 if a comprehensive peace settlement is reached. 
UNOSOM I 
On April 27, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 751 which authorized 
the deployment of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor a cease-fire 
between clans and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM I initially 
consisted of 50 observers and a 450 man security force. When the limited UN operation 
did little to end the crisis, President Bush authorized an airlift to provide humanitarian 
relief on August 16. When the situation continued to deteriorate, President Bush offered 
to lead a multinational humanitarian assistance operation under UN authority.    On 
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December 3, the Security Council authorized the US-led effort under Chapter VII to 
restore peace, stability, and law and order within Somalia. 
The force, consisting of the US, Australia, Canada, Italy, and France, became the 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The US portion of the operation was called Operation 
Restore Hope. The mission was to "secure the major air and sea ports, key installations 
and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide 
security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing 
humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for 
uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations 
to U.N. peacekeeping forces."110 The operation began on December 9, and by the end of 
the year the joint-force totalled over 25,000 with over 10,000 soldiers on the ground. 
The force had seized and secured all vital ports and food distribution centers by 
December 28. By late February, the situation on the ground was considered secure for the 
provisions of humanitarian relief operations stipulated in the American mission statement. 
UNITAF had conducted operations to partially disarm the population and was ready to 
transition the operation in Somalia to UN control. 
ONUMOZ 
On December 16, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 797 establishing 
the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The mandate was to verify the cease-fire, 
elections, and police neutrality in accordance with the General Peace Agreement of 
October 4, and to provide humanitarian assistance. Elections were held October 27-29, 
1994, and the mission ended on December 9. The US provided MILOBs and logistical 
support to the operation. 
UNQSQM II 
On March 26, 1993, Security Council Resolution 814 established the UN Operation 
in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).   The mandate, authorized under Chapter VII, included 
110Allard, Kenneth, Somalia Operations:  Lessons Learned. (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 16. 
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disarming the Somali clans, establishing a central government and ensuring a secure 
environment throughout the country. The US provided over 3,000 logistics personnel and 
an infantry battalion for a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The force was under US tactical 
command and had a mission to conduct "military operations to consolidate, expand, and 
maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic 
assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia."111 
On June 5, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ambush blamed on supporters 
of Muhammad Aideed. The Security Council passed Resolution 837 the next day, 
demanding the immediate apprehension of those responsible. The US deployed Task 
Force Ranger, consisting of forces from the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to 
assist in the apprehension. On October 3, 18 US soldiers were killed attempting to capture 
those responsible for the Pakistani ambush. After a brief build-up of forces in Somalia, 
the US began to withdraw. After all US forces departed, the remnants of UNISOM II had 
to be evacuated by Marines in March 1994. 
UNOMUR 
In June 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 846 establishing the UN 
Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (ONOMUR) to ensure that military assistance to 
Rwandan rebels did not cross the border. In August, the belligerents signed the Arusha 
peace agreement. ONOMUR did not address the deteriorating conditions within Rwanda 
and was administratively integrated into a second UN operation in September 1994. 
UNOMIG 
On August 24, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 858 establishing the 
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The force consisted of 88 MILOBs with 
a mandate of verifying compliance with the July 27 Cease-fire Agreement between Georgia 
and separatist forces in Abkhazia. The cease-fire was broken in September, but the 
December 1 Memorandum of Understanding provided a forum to reach a settlement. The 






Security Council authorized an additional 50 MILOBs on December 22. The US did not 
contribute to this mission. 
UNQMIL 
On September 22, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 866 establishing 
the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The force consisted of some 300 
MILOBs with a mandate of monitoring the cease-fire, observing elections, and 
coordinating humanitarian assistance. UNOMIL worked in cooperation with peacekeepers 
from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the first instance of 
a UN peacekeeping operation being established with a regional organization. The US did 
not participate in this operation. 
UNMIH 
On September 30, 1991, the first democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, was ousted in a bloody coup. In September 1992, the joint UN/OAS 
International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was dispatched to monitor human-rights 
abuses. When OAS economic sanctions failed to affect the situation, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 841 on June 16, 1993, establishing an oil and arms embargo. On July 
3, 1993, General Cedras and Aristide signed the Governors Island Agreement which was 
to restore Aristide to power by October 30. On September 23, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 867 authorizing an expansion of MICIVIH to assist in the transition. In early 
October it became clear that Cedras was unwilling to cede power. When US and Canadian 
military components were turned away at the port on October 11, all UN police and 
military personnel departed Haiti. 
A series of Security Council resolutions tightened the embargo on Haiti. On July 
31, 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 940 which authorized the establishment 
of a multinational force and the use of force to restore Aristide to power and the UN 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to accept control of the operation after the country was 
stabilized. On September 18, a forced entry was averted when Cedras learned of the 
departure of the 82nd Airborne Division and agreed to voluntarily vacate the country. The 
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US-led multinational force landed the next day and there were over 19,000 soldiers on the 
ground by October 17. 
The mission was to "establish a secure environment for the restoration of 
constitutional government...other measures include neutralizing armed opposition, 
preserving essential civic order and protecting the safety of U.S. citizens and the 
international presence in the country, including humanitarian relief."112 On January 30, 
1995, the UN authorized the deployment of a military component for UNMIH and 
established a transition date of March 31. General Kinzer was selected by the UN to 
command of the military component of UNMIH, making him the first American to 
command a UN peace operation. 
UNAMIR 
On October 5, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 872 authorizing the 
establishment of a 2,500 man military contingent, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR). The mandate consisted of a four phased operation to promote the 
establishment of a government, provide security to refugees, coordinate humanitarian 
assistance, supervise disengagement and demobilization of factions, and provide security 
for elections. In April 1994 the Rwandan president died in a plane crash and the country 
disintegrated into ethnic warfare and the UN force decreased to 450 troops. On May 17, 
the Security Council passed Resolution 988 authorizing a force of 5,500, but the US 
argued against the deployment of the whole force and only a 675 man contingent was 
deployed. 
On June 8, the Security Council passed Resolution 925 authorizing the rest of the 
5,500 troops with a mandate to provide secure areas to protect refugees and imposed an 
arms embargo on Rwanda. On June 22, lack of support to the operation led the Security 
Council to pass Resolution 929 authorizing the French to intervene militarily to accomplish 
Resolution 925. On July 29, President Clinton ordered the military to conduct operations 
112Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, 






in Rwanda to provide humanitarian assistance and achieve the objectives of Resolution 
925. By mid-August over 1,600 soldiers from the 325th Infantry, 10th and 3rd Special 
Forces, and support units were in Africa conducting Operation Support Hope. The US 
force did not operate under the UN and were redeployed on September 29 after UNAMIR 
was fully established. 
C. DOCTRINE 
The 1990 revision of FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict 
dedicated a chapter to peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations were defined as 
"military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to 
maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution to a conflict between the 
belligerents."113 The principles of peacekeeping operations included: consent - between 
disputing parties, participating nations and interested states; neutrality - amongst the 
peacekeepers; balance - geographic, political and functional composition of the force; 
single-manager control - a clear chain of command; concurrent action - on the diplomatic 
front; unqualified sponsor support - host nations allow freedom of action to the force; 
freedom of movement - in the mandated area of operation; and self-defense - the inherent 
right within the ROE to self-protection. 
Peacemaking operations were defined as "a type of peacetime contingency 
operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force."114 
These operations were described as a means to stop a violent conflict to force the 
belligerent parties to adopt political and diplomatic methods to resolve problems. Because 
the objective was political in nature the level of force should be sufficient to stop the 
conflict, but applied with discretion. The manual also included an annex on how to 
prepare an area handbook for peacekeeping operations. 
113FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. (Washington, DC: 
USGPO, December 1990), p. Glossary-6. 








The 1991 TRADOC PAM 525-5 AirLand Operations introduced the concept of an 
operational continuum. Within the theater strategic environment are three ascending levels 
of hostility: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. Operations short-of-war could 
occur in an environment of conflict or peacetime competition, while warfighting situations 
could occur in an environment of war or conflict. Operations short-of-war, which 
encompass support for insurgency and counter insurgency, combatting terrorism, 
peacekeeping operations and contingency operations, were considered to be the greatest 
threat to US national interests for the next decade. However, none of these operations 
were defined and the operations short-of-war received a total of two pages. Most of the 
manual described changes to AirLand Battle doctrine. 
The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 Operations included the three-tiered operational 
continuum and changed operations short-of-war to Operations Other Than War (OOTW). 
OOTW were defined as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not 
necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."115 Figure 1 was used 
to highlight the range of military operations, the environment that they are conducted in, 
and the goals they serve. The manual expanded its scope to include chapters on force 
projection, joint operations, combined operations and operations other than war. 
The principles of OOTW included: objective - clearly defined, decisive and 
attainable; unity of effort - toward every objective; legitimacy - sustain the willing 
acceptance of the populace; perseverance - measured, protracted application of military 
capabilities; restraint - disciplined application of force through ROE; and security - 
protection of forces at all times. Operations that are included in peace operations (FM 
100-23) include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and shows of force. New definitions included 
peacemaking - a diplomatic process or military actions to end a dispute and peace 
enforcement - military intervention to forcefully restore peace. 
115FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington, DC: USGPO, June 1993), p. Glossary-6. 
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FM 100-5 Operations, p. 2-1 
Figure 1.  Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment 
In September 1993, Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations was published as 
the keystone document for joint doctrine. The same principles governing OOTW in the 
1993 FM 100-5 Operations were used in this manual for military operations other than 
war. All of the terms and definitions in this manual relating to peace operations were 
provided for information and proposed for inclusion in other manuals, to include Joint Pub 
1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Peace operations were divided 
into three general areas: peacemaking (diplomatic actions), peacekeeping (noncombat 
military operations), and peace enforcement (coercive use of force). 
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Peace operations were defined as "operations not involving the use of unrestricted, 
intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate."116 Other pertinent definitions were 
proposed for peace enforcement - use or threat of force pursuant to UN authorization, 
peacemaking - actions taken through Chapter VI of the UN Charter, preventive diplomacy 
- actions taken before violence occurs, and traditional peacekeeping - deployment of UN, 
regional or coalition presence with the consent of all parties concerned to facilitate 
implementation of an existing truce in support of diplomatic efforts. 
In April 1994, Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Peacekeeping Operations provides current doctrine for UN and non-UN peacekeeping 
operations (PKOs). The manual acknowledges that there is no universally accepted 
definition for peacekeeping and provides a restrictive definition for the military. 
Peacekeeping is defined as "Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with 
the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of 
an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political 
settlement."117 
The manual lists three broad roles that the US may perform in PKOs: 
peacekeeping support - funding and logistical support (supplies, airlift and sealift); 
observer missions - individual military observer (MILOBS); and peacekeeping forces - 
individuals for staff duty, specialized teams for support, or combat units with supporting 
units. There are three tasks that may be associated with PKOs: peace observation - 
reporting on the disposition of forces within the AO; internal supervision and assistance - 
mandated maintenance of law and order and support to civil authorities; and monitoring 
the terms of the protocol - establishment of buffer zones and cease-fire lines. 
116Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations  (Washington, DC:  USGPO, September 
1993), p. GL-13. 
117Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping 
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The manual lists six tasks which may be associated with PKOs; supervision of free 
territories, supervision of cease-fires, supervision of withdrawals and disengagements, 
supervision of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, supervision of demilitarization and 
demobilization, and maintenance of law and order. The manual provides a thorough 
description of the framework for peacekeeping operations and an explanation of the 
differences between UN and other peacekeeping operations. It is a comprehensive manual 
which provides the basis for military training, preparation, deployment to, execution and 
redeployment from peacekeeping operations. 
The August 1994 TRADOC PAM 525-1 Force XXI Operations is a unique 
publication. It is not a doctrinal manual, it was developed to provide a coherent concept 
for "experiments and discovery of needed change, resulting in improved results in both 
War and Operations Other Than War."118 The manual states that there can be no single 
authoritative doctrine for the current strategic period and that the principles within the 
Force XXI concept must be translated into specific scenarios during mission planing. 
Boundaries within the spectrum of operations will continue to become more blurred, 
eliminating all-purpose doctrinal templates. The manual assesses OOTW or LIC as the 
predominant category of military operations that the US military will face over the next 
few decades. 
In December 1994, FM 100-23 Peace Operations was published. It provides 
guidance for the full range of peace operations and addresses the environment, related 
concepts and principles, and fundamentals, to include planning, operational considerations, 
training, and supporting functions."119 Peace operations were divided into three categories 
of activities: Support to Diplomacy which includes Peacemaking, Peace Building, and 
Preventive Diplomacy; Peacekeeping which includes Observation and Monitoring of 
Truces and Cease-Fires and the Supervision of Truces; and Peace Enforcement which 
118TRADOC PAM 525-5 Force XXI Operations. (Fort Monroe, VA:  USGPO, August 
1994), p. ii. 
119FM 100-23 Peace Operations. (Washington, DC:  USGPO, December 1994), p. iii. 
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includes Restoration and Maintenance of Order and Stability, Protection of Humanitarian 
Assistance, Guarantee and Denial of Movement, Enforcement of Sanctions, Establishment 
and Supervision of Protected Zones, and the Forcible Separation of Belligerents. 
Support to diplomacy is subordinate to the diplomatic peacemaking process and 
may take place during peacetime or wartime. Peacemaking is a diplomatic process which 
seeks to end disputes and resolve conflicts which could lead to conflict. Supporting 
operations include military-military relations, security assistance operations, exercises and 
peacetime deployments. Peacebuilding is a post- conflict activity. Supporting operations 
include restoring civil authority, conduct of elections, demobilization of former belligerent 
parties, and nation assistance. Preventive diplomacy seeks to prevent of limit the extent 
of a predictable crisis. Supporting operations include preventive deployments, shows of 
force, and higher levels of readiness to demonstrate US resolve. 
Peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the 
consent of all major belligerent parties. Complete neutrality is required for success. 
Observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires involve individual military personnel 
which form a group of monitors under the authority of an international agreement. 
Supporting missions include reporting and monitoring activity, supervision of an 
agreement, investigations of complaints and violations, negotiations and mediation, and 
liaison with various parties to the mandate. Supervision of truces involves the deployment 
of units to fulfill a mandate and permit diplomatic negotiations. Supporting missions 
include patrolling, establishing movement control points, supervision of the withdrawal 
of belligerent forces, supervision of demobilization, providing law and order, and 
humanitarian relief. 
Peace enforcement operations include the application or threat of military force, 
normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance in order to restore 
peace and support diplomatic efforts to a political settlement. Restoration and maintenance 
of order and stability involves the restoration of order and stability where civil authority 
is threatened or has ceased to function, or where human rights are endangered. Protection 
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of humanitarian assistance involves the safeguarding of those providing assistance and 
relief supplies, which may have to be delivered by the Army. Guarantee and denial of 
movement involves control of the battle space either to ensure freedom of navigation or 
to deny movement by belligerent parties. Enforcement of sanctions involves the denial of 
supplies, diplomatic and trading privileges, and freedom of movement to a sanctioned 
state. Establishment and supervision of protected zones involves the safeguarding of 
minorities, refugees, or military forces separated from their main body of troops. Forcible 
separation of belligerents involves intervention in a conflict against the will of one or more 
of the belligerents to establish the conditions necessary for peace. 
The differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement involve the variables 
of consent, force, and impartiality. In peacekeeping consent is clear, force is only used 
in self-defense or defense of the mandate, and the perception of impartiality is required for 
success. In peace enforcement consent is not absolute, force or the threat of force may be 
used to coerce or compel, and the perception of impartiality, while desired, is not required 
for success. (Figure 2) 
The principles of peace operations, although revised slightly, are essentially the 
same as the principles for OOTW in the 1990 FM 100-20. The tenets of Army operations 
in the 1993 FM 100-5 are revised to describe the characteristics which are fundamental 
to success. Versatility implies the ability too be multifunctional and requires competence 
in tasks which ensure unit success. Initiative implies that the force conducting peace 
operations controls events by anticipating belligerent actions and using the means available 
in the mandate to forestall, prevent, or negate their occurrence. Agility is the ability to 
react faster to events than any of the belligerent parties through situational awareness. 
Depth belligerent parties through situational awareness. Depth involves a proper campaign 
plan which coordinates time, space, resources and purpose to affect the environment and 
conditions required for success. Synchronization involves the ability to maximize 
resources by anticipating the ways in which the belligerents may interact and deploying 
resources where and when needed. 
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mandate from interference) 
Sufficient to 
compel/coerce 
Impartiality High High Low 
FM 100-23 Peace Operations, p. 13 
Figure 2.  Operational Variables 
D. MILITARY LITERATURE 
The articles published during this epoch centered on several areas of concern 
ranging from Desert Shield/Storm, to the effects of the drawdown, to changes in the global 
strategic situation to doctrinal changes. Relevant articles were discussed within the 
categories of the UN, Somalia and Rwanda, OOTW, peace operations, and the role of the 
Army in the post-Cold War world. The process of adjustment to the new domestic and 
foreign political realities continued. The overwhelming consensus amongst the authors 
was that although we needed to remain prepared to fight and win the nation's wars, the 
projected missions of the Army would continue to be dominated by LIC, OOTW, and 
peace operations. 
There were six articles published which related to UN peace operations. The first 
article described the rapid change in the level of forces that have been involved in UN 
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peace operations since 1990.120 LTC Baker detailed the history of UN peacekeeping and 
US involvement in multinational peacekeeping and concluded that although the UN has 
had a relative amount of success conducting peacekeeping, it has not matured into an 
organization that understands the military subtleties that assist in success. "It is absurd to 
put troop units from widely disparate armies together under the UN flag and assume they 
will work side-by-side in harmony."121 He warned that the US must avoid deploying 
troops because of the media and must ensure that national interests are at stake. He 
acknowledged that peace operations were politically desirable for the US and asserted that 
they may become the primary military mission in the post-Cold war era. 
The second article asserted that the UN had forty years of peacekeeping history to 
draw from and had recently violated every principle articulated by the Under-Secretary 
General for Peacekeeping Operations.122 John Hillen argued that current Army doctrine 
contributes to problems within peacekeeping operations because it attempts to link its war 
fighting doctrine to OOTW and peacekeeping doctrine. UN doctrine has caused problems 
because of an attempt to link peacekeeping doctrine to more ambitious enforcement 
actions. To attain success, individual Army professionals must realize the substantive 
difference between war and peacekeeping, the Army must realize that missions will not 
always be clearly defined and decisive, and the policymakers must realize that the 
environment of peacekeeping is not conducive to quick solutions and educate the public. 
The UN must adapt to the new realities and adhere to the principles developed over forty 
years of experience. 
Three other articles discussed various aspects of role of the US in UN 
peacekeeping.   COL Farris described the mission of UNTAC and declared it was a 
120Baker, James, "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations," Parameters, Spring 
1994, pp. 13-26. 
mIbid., p. 19. 
122Hillen, John III, "UN Collective Security:  Chapter Six and a Half," Parameters, 
Spring 1994, pp. 27-37. 
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successful operation.123 He asserted that the US would continue to be involved in 
multinational peacekeeping and offered eleven policy implications. MAJ Kearns, USMC, 
asserted that the US has become the global "911" for emergencies and that US combat 
troops must remain under US command, with UN authorization, when deployed.124 He 
offered six criteria for involvement and declared that if it was in the US national interest 
to deploy troops, it should deploy the largest contingent to ensure US command of the 
operation. Jan Goldman detailed the history of UN peacekeeping operations and believed 
that the UN could perform a useful role in the dawn of new era and advance US 
interests.125 He argued UN peacekeeping operations are the best avenue towards conflict 
resolution, but that with a clear mandate from UN members peace enforcement was a 
viable operation. 
Nine articles discussed specific operations; one on Operation Provide Comfort, 
seven on Somalia, and one on Rwanda. LTC Abizaid described Operation Provide 
Comfort and provided insight on recommended training and institutional revisions.126 He 
discussed the challenges of expanding a security zone without resorting to force, the 
requirement for local intelligence and the development of a "flying checkpoint" to separate 
the Iraqis and the Kurds. To meet the growing demands on the Army to conduct 
operations like Provide Comfort, he recommended that the study of peacekeeping 
campaigns be included in doctrinal literature, the CTCs be expanded for peacekeeping 
123Farris, Karl, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success," 
Parameters, Spring 1994, pp. 38-50. 
124Kearns, Darien, "The Need for Criteria in UN Peace Operations," Military Review, 
July 1994, pp. 34-42. 
125Goldman, Jan, "A Changing World, A Changing UN," Military Review, September 
1994, pp. 12-18. 











missions, drills for the establishment of checkpoints be standardized, and that US forces 
performing peacekeeping operations have adequate tactical mobility. 
Dennis Steele detailed the deployment of over 20,000 military personnel to Somalia 
with the mission of creating a safe environment for humanitarian assistance.127 The plan 
was to stabilize the situation and then to disengage combat forces from the "peacemaking 
mission" and transition into a UN led peacekeeping mission. He noted that the operation 
was commonly referred to as a peacekeeping operation and that the level of violence 
appeared to be increasing. The next article written explained how CENTCOM 
successfully planned, executed, and transitioned from UNITAF to UNISOM II.128 MG 
Freeman, CPT Lambert (USN), and LTC Mims proclaimed that "Restore Hope has 
become the prototype for humanitarian assistance interventions. "129 However, they noted 
that long-term tasks and tasks which could offered no measurement of success were 
eliminated from the mission statement. They stated that additional tasks "which may be 
essential to long-term security in Somalia" were not part of the CENTCOM mission 
statement and labeled them "mission creep."130 
The next article described the actions that led up to the October 3, 1993, Task 
Force Ranger mission which resulted in the death of eighteen soldiers.131 The article gave 
an accurate description of the events and described the reinforcements being sent to 
Somalia.   MG Arnold described the operations in Somalia from the deployment of 
127Steele, Dennis, "Army Units Deploy to Assist Starving, War-Torn Somalia," Army, 
February 1993, pp. 24-28. 
128Freeman, Waldo; Lambert, Robert & Mims, Jason, "Operation Restore Hope: A US 
CENTCOM Perspective," Military Review, September 1993, pp. 61-72. 
129Ibid.,p.72. 
130Ibid., p. 67. 
131 Steele, "Mogadishu, Somalia: The Price Paid," Army, November 1993, pp. 25-26. 
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UNITAF as part of UNISOM I through participation in UNISOM II.132 Tactical 
operations such as air assaults, cordon and searches, patrolling, and military operations in 
urban terrain where conducted through a modified battlefield operating system (BOS), 
which added force protection, external coordination, and information dissemination, while 
dropping air defense because of lack of threat. He offered nine lessons learned from the 
operation and accurately predicted that the stumbling block for UNISOM II success would 
be the power of the warlords (article written prior to October). 
Walter Clark asserted that the failure in Somalia was caused by the inability to 
develop a strategic vision which integrated political goals with military missions.133 He 
assessed the UNITAF operation as a perfectly executed military exercise, but that it was 
performed without necessary political goals. The failure in Somalia was caused by the 
inability of the UN to effectively recognize the differences between Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII operations. An expanded mandate without an adjustment to political-military 
realities within Somalia led to a loss of UN control. 
Two articles, written by COL Lorenz, USMC, detailed various legal aspects of the 
Somalia operation. In the first article, he discussed legal authority, ROE, weapons buy- 
back programs, weapons confiscation policy, use of deadly force, use of non-lethal force, 
detention of civilians, women and children as combatants, and the transition to UNISOM 
II.134 He highlighted the need for ROE to be easily understood, the need for a clear policy 
on weapons confiscation, and better relations with humanitarian relief organizations. In 
the second article, he discussed the need to develop specialized equipment, training, and 
132Arnold, S.L., "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," Military Review, 
December 1993, pp. 26-35. 
133Clarke, Walter, "Testing the Worlds Resolve in Somalia," Parameters, Winter 1993, 
pp. 42-58. 











ROE for the use of non-lethal force.135 He also highlighted the need to plan for the 
detention of civilians and the development and training of a police force and establishment 
of a judicial system. 
The final article discussed the deployment of troops to Rwanda as part of Operation 
Support Hope.136 Up to 4,000 military personnel were deploying to accomplish a 
humanitarian mission. Support Hope was to have five phases: stabilization of the refugee 
situation, the fostering of stability, a transition to UN control, and the redeployment of US 
troops and equipment. The affects of the Somalia operation were clear in the assertion that 
the US forces were not taking part directly in any peacekeeping operation, but were only 
providing equipment and support capabilities. 
Four article discussed OOTW or LIC. The first article examined President 
Clinton's foreign policy and concluded that the US may be called upon to conduct NEO, 
civil-military operations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement in Haiti.137 COL Mendel 
examined the situation and offered advice for the conduct of each operation, advising that 
inter-agency and national coordination were required for success. David Tucker argued 
that nation assistance was destined to fail because of the economic problems associated 
with modernization and other cultural factors.138 He argued that it was a distraction in LIC 
doctrine and should be removed to allow a better focus on counterinsurgency. 
55. 
135Lorenz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military Review, August 1994, pp. 46- 
136Steele, "The Mission:  Stop the Dying," Army, September 1994, p. 15. 
137Mendel, William, "The Haiti Contingency," Military Review, January 1994, pp. 48- 
57. 
138Tucker, David, "Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance," Parameters, 
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COL Hunter examined the effect of ethnic conflict on two military operations 
within OOTW, support to counterinsurgency and peace operations.139 He noted the recent 
proliferation of contingency operations that focused on short-term objectives rather than 
long-term problems, predicting this precedent would hold for the near future. He 
predicted that all Army forces would be called upon to conduct OOTW and that the 
category of peace operations needed to be seriously addressed. 
The final article on OOTW described the missions of the 10th Mountain Division 
in Florida (Operation Andrew Relief) and Somalia.140 MG Arnold and MAJ Stahl discuss 
the affects of training for warfighting tasks on OOTW and participation in OOTW on 
warfighting. They conclude that the experience of the division proves that no changes are 
required in current training doctrine or mission essential tasks. Challenges for the Army 
included developing parallel planning organizations, force management during 
deployments, a revitalized strategic lift, developing effective ROE and preparing for 
operations in areas without a significant infrastructure. They conclude that the current 
Army doctrine is flexible enough to adapt to any mission. 
Three articles discussed peace operations. LTC Eikenberry stressed the importance 
of peacekeeping operations in conflict containment and the requirement that they be 
properly planned and executed to safeguard soldiers lives.141 To effectively prepare for 
peacekeeping operations force structures and roles and missions must be scrutinized, units 
expected to participate should develop a peacekeeping mission essential task list (METL), 
CTCs should include PKOs and the use of foreign area officers (FAOs) and observers 
139Hunter, Horace, "Ethnic Conflicts and Operations Other Than War," Military 
Review, November 1993, pp. 18-24. 
140Arnold, S.L. and Stahl, David, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than 
War," Parameters, Winter 1993, pp. 4-26. 









should be increased. He concluded that the Army didn't need to make any abrupt changes 
to force structure, doctrine, or training, but that some shifts in emphasis were required. 
COL Allen, COL Johnson, and COL Nelson assessed the Army's future role in 
international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and discussed the impact on 
the Army.142 They believed that the Army would participate in a growing number of peace 
operations and that doctrine needed immediate attention to standardize definitions and 
place parameters on the numerous types of peace operations. They recommended that 
training be standardized and that units be allowed four to six weeks to train under a mobile 
training team and then rotate through the Carnis peace vignette at the JRTC. They 
concluded by recommending the Army take the lead in supporting the notion that the best 
US contribution to peace operations is logistical rather than combat support. 
The final article on peace operations discussed the differences between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement and provided measures of success.143 LTC Hunt 
argued that the Marines in Lebanon were deployed in a manner consistent with 
peacekeeping in an environment of peace enforcement. A peace enforcement operation 
requires political representation down to the battalion level to ensure success. The force 
must be built up rapidly and use of force must be limited to that required to coerce or 
compel, conducting tactical operations for strategic gain. Measures of success include a 
negotiations in progress, a reduction or halt in the fighting, and the commitment by the 
warring factional leaders and their followers to peaceful resolution. Although there is no 
guarantee of success, the attempt must be considered worth the effort. 
The final category of the role of the Army in the post-Cold war is the largest, 
containing fifteen articles. Two articles argued that a separate force structure was required 
for peace operations.   Regina Gaillard argued that a US Development Corps should be 
142Allen, William; Johnson, Antione & Nelsen, John II, "Peacekeeping and Peace 
Enforcement Operations," Military Review, October 1993, pp. 53-61. 
143Hunt, John, "Thoughts on Peace Support Operations," Military Review, October 
1994, pp. 76-85. 
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formed, with a Civilian Conservation Corps added to the organization, to conduct 
peacekeeping operations.144 The new organization would require a new doctrine which 
exempts LIC and concentrates on humanitarian assistance, civic action and peacekeeping. 
LTC Demarest argued that a Utility Division should be formed to support the full range 
of OOTW.145 The Division would be organized under the Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) and be deployed as a primary or support package to peace operations. The idea 
is to provide the Army with a flexible package to provide possible answers to problems in 
the new era. 
Four articles operational discussed aspects of the continuum of military operations. 
LTC Thurman discussed the continuum of military operations as a means to ensure the 
proper forces are committed and that a realistic endstate is envisioned.146 The four major 
points of the article are that political objectives must be matched to military operations, 
military capabilities must be developed for nation assistance, CINCs must be able to 
conduct a myriad of operations simultaneously, and that operations conducted prior to 
hostilities will assist in achieving the desired endstate during post-conflict activities. 
LTC Kingseed asserted that the Army is the best force to accomplish peacetime 
engagement.147 As the national security strategy changes, the Army must adapt to new 
realities. The role of nation assistance should be emphasized as a means to help 
developing countries and prevent the outbreak of conflict and the requirement to deploy 
combat forces to quell problems.  LTC Rampy discussed the role of the Army in post- 
144Gaillard, Regina, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations 
in," Military Review, June 1991, pp. 30-41. 
145Demarest, Geoffrey B., "Beefing Up at the Low End," Military Review, June 1993, 
pp. 50-??. 
146Thurman, Edward, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis, and War," Military Review, 
April 1992, pp. 27-35. 
147Kingseed, Cole, "Peacetime Engagement:  Devising the Army's Role," Parameters, 











conflict activities and the need to develop relevant doctrine.148 The relationship between 
political goals, military strategy, and operational planning is focused on the endstate. The 
challenge is to ensure that when forces are deployed a realistic endstate is envisioned and 
that all actions are focused on attaining conflict termination. 
LTC Rinaldo emphasized that peacetime presence operations are a vital element of 
the national security strategy of the US.149 Peacetime operations such as peacekeeping and 
civil-military operations are perfectly suitable for Army elements. The American people 
and Congress must realize that short-term solutions do nothing to solve long-term 
problems and could alienate other countries from the US. Peacekeeping operations are 
becoming a common mission and will continue to grow in numbers. The Army must shift 
its emphasis to peacetime activities to effectively support national interests in the post-Cold 
war. 
The final nine articles discussed the role of the Army in the post-Cold war world. 
General Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, published five articles in an eighteen month span. 
In April 1993, he stressed the importance on remaining focused on the Army's mission to 
fight and win wars, but that other missions such as nation assistance, peacekeeping, and 
peacemaking were becoming more likely missions.150 He stressed that AirLand Battle 
doctrine would continue to be the centerpiece of Army doctrine and that the new FM 100-5 
Operations would soon be published to address new missions. 
148Rampy, Michael, "The Endgame:  Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict 
Activities," Military Review, October 1992, pp. 42-54. 
149Rinaldo, Richard, "The Army as Part of a Peace Dividend," Military Review, 
February 1993, pp. 45-54. 
150Sullivan, Gordon, "U.S. Army 1993:  Power Projected, Contingency Orientated," 
Army, April 1993, pp. 18-25. 
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In the next article he stressed the changes that would be required within the Army 
to adapt to the new national security strategy.151 Implications for the Army included the 
need to redefine regionalism, recognizing that different regions of the world required 
different types of power projection, and having the ability to rapidly project power in 
support of US and international interests. A flexible force trained to conduct non-combat 
missions such as peacekeeping, civic action, and humanitarian relief operations is critical 
to success. However, the Army must remain committed to successfully executing combat 
operations when regional problems erupt. 
In July 1993, he stressed that raining was the key to success in the new era and that 
the CTCs were adapting to meet new challenges.152 The increased likelihood of 
contingency operations led to the introduction of LIC scenarios at CTCs. A rotation at 
Hohenfels, Germany of Dutch peacekeepers preparing for their UN rotation to Cambodia 
was given as an example of the new changes. In October 1993, he stressed that the Army 
must shift paradigms to meet new realities.153 Increased emphasis on peacekeeping, 
humanitarian relief and counterdrug tasks has resulted in new doctrine and improved 
training at CTCs which now include journalists, local police, and religious and ethnic 
factions. The challenge of conducting these operations while continuing to train and 
prepare for war is being met. 
The last article discusses the potential for the Army to assist in the national strategy 
of enlargement, but warns that an increased involvement could affect warfighting 
151Sullivan, "Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism," Parameters, 
Summer 1993, pp. 2-15. 
152Sullivan, "Flexibility Sets the Pace at Training Combat Centers," Army, July 1993, 
pp. 28-35. 











capabilities.154 The challenges of ethnic conflict, major regional conflict and peace are 
discussed. Army operations in response to ethnic conflict may include peacekeeping 
(MFO), preventive deployments (Macedonia) or the imposition of peace (Panama). Army 
operations in response to major regional conflict focus on the ability to quickly defeat an 
adversary and establish control over terrain and populations. The challenges of peace 
require that the Army be able to perform peace support operations, but at a level which 
does not hinder the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional 
conflicts. 
COL Swain discussed the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations and advised that the Army 
needs to do five things to meet new challenges.155 The Army needs a correct strategic 
rationale, a concept of supporting military operations, proportional research and 
development and procurement of equipment, an independent proponent focused on joint 
operations, and a credible spokesman who can articulate Army requirements as a means 
of serving national interests. The Army is currently meeting these five requirements, but 
must ensure that it avoids developing an inward looking mentality and continues to prepare 
for a fluid world with unexpected challenges. 
General Reimer, FORSCOM Commander, discussed the development of a seamless 
Army which stands ready to meet any challenge.156 The first peacekeeping rotation at the 
JRTC involved government, nongovernment, and military agencies to properly train all 
participants. In January 1995, a rotation to the Sinai would include a mix of active and 
reserve soldiers. The process of reshaping to meet changes in the global environment must 
retain the ability to fight and win the nation's wars.    General Franks, TRADOC 
154Sullivan & Twomey, Andrew, "The Challenges of Peace," Parameters, Autumn 
1994, pp. 4-17. 
155Swain, Richard, "Adapting to Change in Times of Peace," Military Review, July 
1994, pp. 50-58. 
156Reimer, Dennis, "U.S. Army Forces Command Focuses on Readiness," Army, 
October 1994, pp. 47-56. 
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Commander cited the August 1994, TRADOC PAM 525-5 as the conceptual guide for thee 
future.157 Although he focused on digitalized battlefields and war, the importance of 
OOTW and the fact that they were an operational reality was stressed. 
The final article discussing the role of the Army described doctrine and the 
revolution in military affairs.158 Dr. Jablonsky discussed how peacekeeping fit into 
doctrine and how the revolution in military affairs affects overall doctrine. UN military 
operations since the end of the Cold war emerged under the category of peace 
enforcement, but were still-born because of the inability to capture lessons learned. The 
Army has adapted well by stressing versatility and agility in the 1993 FM 100-5 
Operations. The challenge is to retain versatility and flexibility by recognizing the affects 
of political and social change as well as technological change. 
E.  SUMMARY 
The fourth epoch was characterized by the beginning of a consolidation of doctrine 
for peace operations and an increase in the political control of US and UN operations. The 
emergence of a cooperative relationship within the UN led to a dramatic increase in the 
number of peace operations authorized and the a widely expanded scope within their 
mandates. New operations included Chapter VII enforcement authority, an increase in the 
number of operations conducted within, rather than betwen countries, and large increases 
in the number of combat forces deployed. 
The Bush administration reacted to the successful UN-sponsored operation in the 
Gulf by pledging to strengthen the ability of the UN to react to crises. He pledged to 
support UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities through greater participation by 
US troops. The Clinton administration sought to use the UN as a means of conducting 
157Franks, Frederick, "The End of the Beginning," Army, October 1994, pp. 59-66. 
158Jablonsky, David, "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," 
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assertive multilateralism and initially drafted a directive which would have increased the 
role of the military in UN operations. 
The deaths in Somalia and the growing problems in the former Yugoslavia caused 
significant revisions within the administration. The revised strategy was issued as PDD 
25 and reflected a cautious, but proactive role for the military in peace operations. 
Although the Clinton administration had not published a national security strategy by the 
end of 1994, PDD 25 provided a clear message that the military would be expected to 
execute the full range of peace operations. 
US participation in peace operations grew significantly during this epoch. The US 
participated in UN peace operations and supported UN peace operations through unilateral 
and multilateral missions that did not fall under UN command. The Somalia operation 
caused a slight pause in US participation because of the inability of the political leadership 
to coherently explain the events that led up to the disaster. The US did not participate in 
the next three UN peace operations and opted to lead the operation in Haiti to preclude US 
forces from being under UN command. The transition to UNMIH was facilitated by the 
fact that an American was in charge of the UN military contingent. At the end of 1994 
it appeared that the Clinton administration wanted to pursue a national security strategy 
that included peace operations, but that US forces would not necessarily be under UN 
command. 
Doctrine evolved significantly during this epoch. The 1993 FM 100-5 Operations 
was expanded to include a spectrum of war continuum which explained the range of 
military operations, the environments, and the goals to be achieved through Army 
operations. Joint-Publications were developed in an attempt to standardize military 
operations and improve the ability of the Armed Forces to execute joint-operations. Joint 
Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations 
provided a basis for planning and executing peacekeeping. The 1994 publication of FM 
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Although its publication was a step forward, it did not provide a comprehensive doctrine 
for the conduct of peace operations. 
The military literature reflected a concerted effort by military leaders to stress the 
importance of peace operations. General Sullivan published five articles that stressed the 
requirement that the Army be prepared to execute peace operations. Numerous articles 
reflected the belief that the Army would execute peace operations and commented on the 
need for a coherent doctrine. This new reality was also reflected in articles which 
discussed the expanded range of missions that were being trained at the CTCs. Although 
most articles predicted that the frequency of peace operations would grow, the requirement 
to fight and win the nation's wars was usually stressed. 
The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations made significant 
progress during this epoch. PDD 25 clearly articulated the importance of peace operations 
in the Clinton administration's unpublished national strategy. Senior Army leaders 
recognized the importance of peace operations and the likelihood that the Army would be 
called upon to execute these missions. Army participation in peace operations grew 
dramatically. Doctrine was expanded and the publication of FM 100-23 provided the first 
doctrinal manual dedicated to peace operations. Military professionals flooded the 
literature with articles on peace operations. 
Progress was made, but the process was far from complete. The Clinton 
administration published PDD 25, but had not published a national security strategy that 
provided guidance to the Army. Senior leaders recognized the importance of peace 
operations, but stressed that the main mission of the Army was to fight and win the 
nation's wars. Army participation in peace operations expanded dramatically, but the 
perceived failure in Somalia dampened the experience. Doctrine was expanded to address 
peace operations, but a comprehensive template was not developed. The military literature 
contained numerous articles on peace operations, but they were considered by many to be 





Peace operations have been accepted as a secondary mission, but have not been 
institutionalized and continue to challenge the Army. This thesis has traced US Army 
participation in peace operations from the end of the WW II to 1994. The national 
security policies of presidential administrations have been examined to determine the role 
they have played in doctrinal development. Individual operations were examined to 
determine the changing role of the military in foreign policy and how each mission was 
conceptualized. Doctrine was examined to determine the doctrinal evolution of peace 
operations. The military literature was examined to determine how professional military 
officers viewed the development of peace operations within the military institution. 
The national security strategy of the US during the first epoch evolved from the 
containment of Communism through collective security, to massive retaliation, to flexible 
response, and ended with the twin policies of detente and rapprochement. A congruence 
of objectives between the US and the UN served as a catalyst for US involvement in UN 
peace operations, but was limited to the use of MILOBs. The US participated in two 
essentially unilateral peace operations in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon. The 
Army's doctrine was expanded to include stability operations, which included missions 
which are now considered peace operations. A broad definition of peacekeeping within 
the government and the Army precluded any progress in the construction of the meaning 
of peace operations. 
The national security strategy of the US during the second epoch evolved from the 
Nixon doctrine, to Carter's focus on diplomacy and human rights, and ended with 
Reagan's revised strategy of containment through a revitalized military. The Army 
responded by developing AirLand Battle doctrine and focusing on the Soviet threat to 
NATO. The UN was ineffective during this epoch because of the increased tensions 
between the US and USSR. Multilateral operations in Lebanon and the establishment of 
the MFO reflected the inability of the UN to function. The deployment of a battalion from 
the 82nd Airborne Division to the MFO and the operations in Lebanon represented a 
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commitment to the use of peace operations to achieve foreign policy objectives. LIC 
doctrine was developed, which included peacekeeping, but was not institutionalized and 
was not included in FM 100-5. Within military literature, a few officers recognized the 
need for doctrinal guidance on the conduct of peace operations. The process of 
constructing the meaning of peace operations began during this epoch, but was hindered 
by a lack of guidance by political and military leaders and the development of doctrine. 
The national security strategy of the US during the third epoch evolved from an 
assertive unilateral focus to a multilateral approach which included a renewed faith in the 
abilities of the UN as the Cold War came to an end. The death of 241 Marines in Lebanon 
was mitigated politically by President Reagan and the Grenada invasion which took place 
two days later. The US did not participate in the five new UN peace operations, but the 
establishment of ONUCA in the American sphere of influence represented the Bush 
administration's confidence in the capabilities of the UN. The Army began to return to 
a spectrum of conflict paradigm, but stressed the AirLand Battle doctrine was applicable 
to all levels of conflict. Within the military literature, two consecutive Army Chief's of 
Staff noted that the likelihood of deploying troops to peace operations was growing. The 
process of constructing the meaning of peace operations continued during this epoch, but 
was hindered by a lack of political guidance, the rarity of operations, and definitional 
problems. 
The national security strategy of the US during the fourth epoch evolved from 
multilateralism to assertive multilateralism under the Clinton administration. PDD 25 was 
the first comprehensive evaluation of the role of peace operations and served as a means 
to communicate the administration's desire to use the UN to further US national interests. 
A cooperative atmosphere within the UN led to an expansion in the number and scope of 
peace operations. The US contributed Army units to five peace operations under UN 
command or authority. The deaths of soldiers in Somalia temporarily interrupted US 
participation, but the successful US-led Haiti operation and transition to UNMIH 
reinforced the US commitment to peace operations. 
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Doctrine was expanded significantly to include a Joint Publication dedicated to 
peacekeeping and FM 100-23 Peace Operations. A spectrum of war paradigm was 
included in FM 100-5 and Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, the keystone 
document for joint doctrine. The military literature reflected the need for the development 
of a comprehensive doctrine to respond to the changes in the international environment. 
The scope of change was evident in the articles concerning training for peace operations 
at the CTCs and the lessons learned from participation in peace operations. However, the 
Army has not institutionalized peace operations. 
The first step in the process of constructing the meaning of peace operations has 
been met. The political leadership began to stress the importance of peace operations in 
the latter end of the Reagan administration and reinforced their importance during the Bush 
administration. The publication of PDD 25 by the Clinton administration clearly 
articulated the requirement for the military to be prepared to execute peace operations. 
Although PDD 25 states that the military's primary mission is to fight and win, the need 
to conduct peace operations is clearly linked to the national security interests of the US. 
The second step in the construction of meaning has begun, but has not yet been 
met. The initial publications on peace operations represents the beginning of doctrinal 
development. A comprehensive doctrine is the next step which must be met. Campaign 
planning for peace operations must consider the unique nature of each peace operation. 
Political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and religious factors must be taken into 
consideration. Doctrine must address training, force composition, conflict dynamics, 
mission structures, and the principles and tenets of peace operations. The Army may need 
to make the conceptual leap from Airland Battle and develop a separate doctrine for these 
operations. 
The third step in the construction of meaning has also begun, but has also not been 
met. The Army leadership has accepted the fact that peace operations will be conducted 
for the foreseeable future. Although they will always be considered a secondary mission, 
they do not have to be considered of secondary concern. Peace operations bring many of 
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the risks of actual combat. Many of the frustrations reflected within the military literature 
are directed at the need for a coherent doctrine. While there is a consensus for the need 
to execute peace operations, there is also a consensus that appropriate doctrine has not 
been developed. 
Initial steps have been taken in doctrinal development, but the process is 
incomplete. Peacekeeping doctrine has progressed the furthest and is generally accepted 
by the Army. Support to diplomacy and peace enforcement continue to challenge the 
Army and there is a consensus that the appropriate conceptual framework has not been 
developed within current doctrine. Until a coherent doctrine is developed, peace 
operations will not be accepted by the Army as an institution. 
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